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Extracontractual Insurance Damages:
Pennsylvania Insureds Demand A
"Piece of the Rock"
I.

Introduction

Although insurance pervades most aspects of our daily lives, it
was not widespread in the United States until the latter part of the
nineteenth century.' During the formative years, the scarcity of legal
precedent and the reluctance of courts to issue stringent regulations
resulted in virtual immunity from liability for insurance companies
that wrongfully delayed or refused to pay insurance benefits.2 In recent years, the tremendous growth of the insurance industry coupled
with the superior bargaining position of the insurer has led to a recognition of the need to balance the relative positions of the insurer
and the insured in order to protect the latter from unreasonable delay and oppression.3 The insurers' promises to the insured to "sim-

plify his life," to put him "in good hands," to be "on his side," and to
back him with a "piece of the rock" hardly suggest that the insured
will be unreasonably abandoned in his time of dire need.' Nevertheless, insurers have unreasonably deserted Pensylvania insureds frequently enough to warrant a remedy. 5
1. T. O'DONNELL, HISTORY OF LIFE INSURANCE IN ITS FORMATIVE YEARS 21 (1936);
Hirsch, Carpenter & Carpenter, Strict Liability.- A Response to the Gruenberg-Silberg Conflict
Regarding Insurance LitigationAwards, 7 Sw. U. L. REv. 310, 310 (1975).
2. The scarcity of legal precedent was the result of three conditions in America. First,
policy coverage was limited in scope, thus resulting in few claims. Second, recoveries were
minimal because policy limits were small in monetary value. And third, court decisions reflected the policy notion of promoting growth in the new insurance industry, which was perceived as a necessary addition to our rapidly developing economy. See also note I supra.
3. See Hirsch, Carpenter & Carpenter, supra note 1, at 310; Comment, Extra-Contractual Damages in Suits on InsrancePolicies, 46 CIN. L. REV. 170, 170 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as 46 CN. L. REV.].
4. D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 262 Pa. Super. Ct. 331, 342-3,
396 A.2d 780, 787 (1978) (dissenting opinion), petitionfor allowance ofappealgranted,No. 119
(Pa. March 28, 1979). "To simplify his life," "to put him in good hands," "to be on his side,"
and "to back him with a piece of the rock" are the respective advertising slogans of the Metropolitan Insurance Company, the Allstate Insurance Company, the Nationwide Insurance
Company, and the Prudential Insurance Company of America. These slogans are typical of
insurance companies' endeavors to solicit insurance and instill confidence in insureds. Insurers are well known for portraying themselves with symbols of stability and strength, such as
the Prudential "rock."
5. Pennsylvania's courts have been inundated with first-party extracontractual cases
during the past five years, and extracontractual damages have been awarded in many of the
cases. See notes 246 & 268 infra.

While the insured may always resort to a contract action for the
face value of a policy plus interest when an insurance company refuses to pay benefits, traditional contract damages usually are inadequate when the insurer wrongfully or tortiously withholds payment.6
The insured not only contracts for monetary coverage in the event of
a loss, but also for the peace of mind in knowing that he is insured
and that he will be promptly reimbursed when a loss occurs. 7 Consequently, the concept of extracontractual damages8 has emerged as
the remedy to compensate the insured for damages beyond policy
limits.
Insurance policies are no longer regarded as mere contracts.
[W]e have taken the law of insurance practically out of the category of contract, and we have established that the duties of public
service companies are not contractual, as the nineteenth century
sought to make them, but are instead relational; they do not flow
from agreements which the public servant make as he chooses,
they flow from the calling in which he has engaged and his consequent relation to the public. 9
Accordingly, a few states have liberalized strict contract rules I0 while
some have enacted statutes in order to permit recovery of extracontractual damages." Other jurisdictions allow a tort action predicated upon the independent tortious conduct of the insurer. 12 This
comment compiles and analyzes the various bases of extracontrac6.

A majority of writers agree that the prevailing measure of contract damages is grossly

inadequate. See, e.g., J. MCCARTHY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH CASES (2d ed. 1978);

Hirsch, Carpenter & Carpenter, supra note I; Lambert, CommercialLitigation, 35 AM. LAW.'S
Ass'N L.J. 164 (1964); Parks, Recovery ofExtra-ContractDamages in Suits on Insurance Policies, 9 FORUM 43 (1973); 46 CIN. L. REV., supra note 3; Comment, The Availability ofExcess
Damagesfor Wrongful Re/usal to Honor FirstPartyInsurance Claims - An Emerging Trend,
45 FORDHAM L. REV. 164 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 45 FORDHAM L. REV.]; Comment, The
Expanding Availability ofPunitive Damages in Contract Actions, 8 IND. L. REV. 668 (1975);
Comment, Tort Liabilityfor an Insurer's Bad Faith Re/usal to Settle- A Developing Trend AppropriateforAdoption in Missouri 45 Mo. L. REV. 103 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 45 Mo. L.
REV.]; Note, Good Faithand FairDealingin Insurance Contracts, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 699 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as 25 HASTINGS L.J.] Note, Indiana'sAllowance ofPunitive Damagesin Contract Actions Against Insurance Companies- How New Is 1t, 55 IND. L.J. 563 (1980); Note,
Insurer's Liabilityfor Emotional Distress, 58 NEB. L. REV. 1167 (1979); Note, Damages/or
Mental Suffering Caused by Insurers.- Recent Developments in the Law ofTort and Contract, 48
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1303 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV.] Note, Insurance-IncreasingLiabilityforRefusal to Pay First Party Claims. Bad Faith andPunitive Damages, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 685 (1977); Note, Tort ofInsurer's Bad Faith Re/usal to Pay
First-PartyClaims, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 579 (1980).
7. Hirsch, Carpenter & Carpenter, supra note 1, at 311.
8. "Extracontractual damages" refer to compensatory and punitive damages that are
awarded "in addition to" and "outside of' any contractual recovery for the face value of the
policy plus interest. Typical compensatory damages "outside of" policy limits include damages for emotional distress, economic loss (e.g., loss of equity in property), and attorney fees.
See, e.g., W. MEYER, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE LAW § 2:68 (Supp. 1979); Thornton,
Extracontractual and Punitive Damage Liability of Insurers, Primary and Reinsurance Coverages, 13 FORUM 754 (1978).
9. R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF COMMON LAW 29 (1929).

10. See notes 33-58 and accompanying text infra.
II. See notes 168-188 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 91-166 and accompanying text infra.

tual liability, focusing on first-party cases 13 in which the insurance
company has wrongfully delayed or refused to pay benefits. 14 Furthermore, this analysis examines Pennsylvania law in light of these
bases, and recommends that Pennsylvania follow the lead of other
states.'" While contract actions permit recovery of all forseeable
compensatory damages, and statutory remedies generally permit recovery of policy value, interest, attorney fees, and limited punitive
awards, an action in tort provides the fullest recovery for the insured
by allowing additional recoveries of exemplary awards and damages
for all proximately caused injury. Since the foundations already exist in Pennsylvania for the torts of bad faith and intentional infliction
of emotional distress, it is recommended that Pennsylvania adopt
these torts in the insurance context so as to more fully compensate
the insured for unlawful delays or denials of payments by insurance
companies.
II.

Contract Remedies

The first basis upon which to predicate extracontractual liability
is a contract action, which allows an insured to recover the face value
of the policy, interest, and all forseeable consequential damages. An
insurer's wrongful refusal to pay benefits, however, may result in
harm to the insured that exceeds forseeable consequential damages
and the amount to which the insured was already entitled. Thus, the
limited potential recovery of the contract remedy makes it the least
desirable for the insured to pursue.
A. Traditional ContractLimitations
The rules of contract law traditionally have been applied to delays and refusals to pay insurance benefits because insurance policies
have been perceived as mere contracts to pay money between insurance companies and insureds.' 6 These rules generally have been
strictly construed under the rationale that breach-of-contract damages must be certain and clearly related to the rights and duties embodied in the insurance contract. 7 Accordingly, three major
13. "First party" or "primary" insurance refers to policies that indemnify the insured for
a loss he personally has suffered, whereas "third party" or "liability" insurance refers to policies that protect the insured against liability to the person or property of a third person. 45
FORDHAM L. REV., supra note 6, at 164 n.l.
14. For an excellent listing of "delay" or "refusal-to-pay" cases, see generally Annot.,
Insurer's Liability for Consequentialor Punitive Damagesfor Wronful Delay or Refusal to
Make Payments Due Under Contracts, 47 A.L.R.3d 314 (1973). Cf. Note, The Widening Scope
oInsurer'sLiability, 63 Ky. L.J. 145 (1975) (excellent listing of "failure-to-settle" cases, which
is a term usually associated with third-party insurance cases).
15. See notes 194-279 and accompanying text infra.
16. 46 CIN. L. REV., supra note 3, at 171; 45 FORDHAM L. REV., supra note 6, at 167.
17. See 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1410 (2d ed. 1936); 46 CIN. L. REV., supra note 3,
at 171; Note, Damages Assessed Against Insurers For Wrongful Failure to Pay, 10 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 466, 467 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 10 WM. & MARY L. REV.].

limitations have developed to preclude extracontractual awards.
1. Contract-to-Pay-Money Rule.-When a successful contract
action is brought against an insurance company, recovery is customarily limited to the debt plus interest because many courts perceive
insurance policies as "contracts to pay money."' 8 This theory is
based upon three premises. First, there exists a presumption that the
parties to an insurance contract have equal bargaining power and
are entirely free to provide explicitly in the contract for any forseeable consequences. 9 Second, the rule presupposes the desirability of
having a simple and certain measure of damages.2" And last, the
rule presumes that because money is always available in the market
at the lawful rate of interest, an award of accrued interest adequately
compensates the insured for delay in payment. 2 1 Because it is believed that these underlying foundations of contracts to pay money
are equally applicable to insurance contracts, damages are limited to
the face value of the policy plus interest, which is unacceptable when
damages from wrongful delay or denial of insurance benefits exceed
such an amount.
2. Handley v. Baxendale Rule of Foreseeability.--Consequential damages for breach of contract are further limited by the rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale,22 which held that the only compensable damages are those arising naturally from the breach or that are reasonably forseeable at the time of contract formation.23 Hadley v.
Baxendale is the seminal contract damages case2 4 in which plaintiff
was forced to suspend operations of his grist mill because of a broken shaft. The shaft was taken to defendant for shipment to an engineering firm that was to manufacture a new shaft using the broken
one as a model. The court found that defendant unreasonably
delayed shipment, thus resulting in excess lost profits that plaintiff
would not have suffered had the shaft been seasonably dispatched.
18. Eg., New Orleans Ins. Ass'n v. Piaggo, 83 U.S. 378, 386 (1872); Bye v. American
Income Life Ins. Co., 316 So. 2d 164, 166 (La. App. 1975); Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980); Independent Grocery Co. v. Sun Ins. Co., 146
Minn. 214, 217, 178 N.W. 582, 583 (1920); Wilson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 528 P.2d
1135, 1139-40 (Okla. App. 1974).
19. Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America, 68 Cal. 2d 822, 851-52, 442 P.2d 377, 395, 69

Cal. Rptr. 321, 339 (1968) (en banc) (dissenting opinion).
20. Id
21. Id
22. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
23. Id at 151.
24. While Hadley v. Baxendale is regarded as the seminal contract damages case regarding forseeable consequential damages, it was preceded by a number of American cases that
followed the same rule. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Ely, 21 Wend. 342 (N.Y. 1839). Hadley and

the American cases, however, appear to have borrowed the consequential damages rule from
the eighteenth century French writer Robert J. Pothier. See Washington, Damages in Contract
at Common Law, 48 L.Q. REV. 90, 103 (1932).

The court reversed a jury award of damages for the lost profits, hold-

ing that plaintiff may only recover those damages "as may fairly and
reasonably be considered.

. .

arising naturally, i.e., according to the

usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself."25 He
may further recover damages "such as may reasonably be supposed
to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they
26
made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it."
The Hadley v. Baxendale rule has been used by some courts to

limit extracontractual damages. For example, it has been held that
the loss of a home because of the inability to meet mortgage payments is not a necessarily forseeable result of an insurer's refusal to
pay benefits. 7 Furthermore, because some courts regard insurance
contracts as commercial rather than personal in nature, it has been

held that an insured may seek only pecuniary benefits and that any
emotional distress resulting from a financial loss is simply not forseeable.2 8 Such results are unsatisfactory for insureds whose major in-

jury resulting from an insurer's refusal to pay is emotional distress.
3. Unavailabilityof Punitive Damages.-The final major obstacle to an insured's recovery of extracontractual damages is that puni-

tive damages generally are not awarded for a breach of contract,
29

regardless of how willful, malicious, or fraudulent the breach.
Such damages are considered too uncertain, speculative, and remote
to be recovered in contract actions. 30 Most jurisdictions, however,
will award punitive damages when a breach of contract constitutes
or is accompanied by an independent malicious or wanton tort, or
involves the malicious or wanton violation of a fiduciary duty.3'
Nevertheless, exemplary awards in such cases are not granted for the
breach of contract per se, but rather for the independent tort or the

breach of fiduciary duty.
25. 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
26. Id
27. See, e.g., Leonard v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 100 Ga. App. 434, 436, 111 S.E.2d 773, 775
(1959); Independent Grocery Co. v. Sun Ins. Co., 146 Minn. 214, 217, 178 N.W. 582, 583
(1920).
28. Cassady v. United Ins. Co. of America, 370 F. Supp. 388, 398 (W.D. Ark. 1974);
Pendleton v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 425, 432 (E.D. La. 1970); Dawkins v. National
Life Ins. Co., 255 F. Supp. 800, 802 (D.S.C. 1966); Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980). See also C. McCoRMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES § 145
(1935).
29. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 400, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78, 92 (1970); Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50
(1980); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 14-3 (2d ed. 1977); C. McCoRMICK, supra
note 28, § 77; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 342 (1932).
30. E.g., Westwater v. Grace Church, 140 Cal. 339, 230 P.2d 36 (1903); Stern v. Abramson, 150 N.J. Super. Ct. 571, 376 A.2d 221 (1977); J. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 1.35.
31. E.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 29, § 14-3; 46 CIN. L. REV., supra note 3,
at 177. See note 58 and accompanying text infra.

B. Liberalization of Contract Limitations
Recognizing the harshness of contract rules, a few courts have
liberalized contract interpretations to permit recoveries of damages
beyond policy limits.3 2 These jurisdictions have determined that the
very nature of insurance contracts differs from other contracts and,
therefore, have awarded damages in contract actions that normally
would not have been awarded outside the insurance context.
1. Abrogation of the Contract-to-Pay-MoneyRule.-The courts
that have liberalized contract rules do not follow the contract-to-paymoney rule because its underlying assumptions are inapplicable to
insurance contracts.3 3 First, these courts reject the idea that parties
to an insurance policy have equal bargaining power. It is well established that insurance policies are adhesion contracts authored solely
by the insurer, the dominant negotiator with superior bargaining
power.3 4 Few policyholders actually dicker over the terms of their
policies. Rather, the insured chooses the insurance company's policy
that best satisfies his needs for the price he is able to afford. Moreover, the disparity alone in economic power between the parties can
be staggering.3 5 Thus, in reality, the insured has little or no ability to
provide for forseeable consequences of nonpayment because of the
very nature of the relationship between the parties to an insurance

policy.
Courts also reject the second premise, which is that the measure
of damages should be simple and certain, because it is the very certainty of the contract-to-pay-money rule that allows insurance companies to take advantage of insureds.3 6 Since the rule so severely
limits the insured's maximum potential recovery, the insurer is encouraged to delay payments as long as possible. The worst the in32. See notes 33, 42, 43 & 56 infra
33. See, e.g., Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America, 68 Cal. 2d 822, 422 P.2d 377, 69
Cal. Rptr. 321 (1968) (en banc). See also Annot., Insurers Liabilityfor Consequential or Punitive Damages for Wrongful Delay or Refiual to Make Payments Due Under Contracts, 47
A.L.R.3d 314, §§ 3-6 (1973).
34. E.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78,
95 (1970); D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l. Cas. Ins. Co. 262 Pa. Super. Ct. 331, 342, n.3,
396 A.2d 780, 785-6 n.3 (1978); 46 CIN. L. REv., supra note 3, at 171; 45 FORDHAM L. REV.,
supra note 6, at 169. In the dissent of Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 581, 510 P.2d
1032, 1042, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 490 (1973), Justice Roth argued that insurance policies should
not be considered true adhesion contracts because most are written and standardized by the
legislatures and, thus, the insured's interest has already been looked after. Id at 582-83, 510
P.2d at 1042, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 491, Accord Tasi, Appellate Arguments Against Extra-Contracutal Damages in First Party Insurance Cases, 47 INs. COUNSEL J. 188, 200 (1980). The
simple fact that the legislature has written the policy does not guarantee that the policy is not
an adhesion contract. It is common knowledge that what is written into legislation is dependent upon which interest group can best influence the legislators, and the consumer lobby is
often small, if not nonexistent, in comparison to the economically powerful insurance company lobby.
35.

45 FORDAM L. REV., supra note 6, at 169 n.33.

36.

46 CIN. L. REV., supra note 3, at 171-72; 45 FoRD, wm L. REV., supra note 6, at 169.

surer may be forced to do is to compensate the insured for attorney
fees and interest on the original obligations; and at best, the insurer
may succeed in avoiding payment altogether.37

The third premise is illusory because money is not always available at the legal rate of interest.3 8 Commercial interest rates often

greatly exceed the legal rates, thereby rendering it profitable for insurance companies to withhold benefits as long as possible to invest

at interest rates in excess of any penalty they might be assessed.39
Moreover, it is highly improbable that loans would even be available
to an insured who has recently suffered an economic loss or a disabling inury, let alone at rates of interest approximating the legal
rate.4 0
Since the three assumptions of the contract-to-pay-money rule
are inapplicable in the insurance context, the rule should not be invoked to prohibit recovery of extracontractual damages.
2 Expansion of the Forseeabiliy Concept.-Some jurisdictions
have lessened the hardship created by the Hadley v. Baxendale rule
by expanding the range of consequential damages that may be
deemed within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the
time of contract formation. 4' As a result, these courts have awarded
37. See note 36 supra.
38. See note 36 supra.
39. See note 36 supra. For example, on March 3, 1980, the legal rate of interest in Pennsylvania was six percent (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 202 (Purdon Supp. 1978-79)) while the
prime rate of interest was sixteen and three-quarters percent. Wall Street J., March 3, 1980, at
2. col. 3.
One writer alleges that the legal rate of interest is a sufficient penalty in light of two other
"controls" to deter insurers' misconduct, viz., the effect of bad publicity on public opinion and
the ability of the insurance commissioner to penalize insurers for violations of state unfair
insurance practices statutes. See Tasi, supra note 34, at 198-99. The effectiveness of bad publicity as a deterrent, however, is questionable since it only indirectly affects the insurers, and
the effectiveness of an insurance commissioner's ability to penalize an insurer is dependent
upon the existence of a sufficient penalty in a statute that authorizes such action. Furthermore,
neither "control" adequately compensates the policyholder whose injuries exceed the policy
amount plus interest. The key to deterrence of insurer misconduct is through the insurers'
pocketbooks, and the monetary penalty must be sufficient in order to truly penalize. Cf
Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of America, 18 Cal. App. 3d 266, 270-71, 95 Cal. Rptr. 678, 681
(1971) ($200,000 punitive award was not unreasonable since it represented less than one week
of after-tax income of the insurer).
40. See Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr.
711 (1974); Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America, 68 Cal. 2d 822, 422 P.2d 377, 69 Cal. Rptr.
321 (1968) (en banc). See also note 36 supra.
41. See notes 42 & 43 infra It is probable that California would also award forseeable
consequential damages beyond policy limits in a contract action when such damages were
reasonably contemplated by the parties. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425,
426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654,
328 P.2d 198 (1958); Venturi v. Zurich General Accident & Liab. Co., 14 Cal. App. 2d 89, 57
P.2d 1002 (1936). This conclusion, however, has been clouded by the decision of Reichert v.
General Ins. Co. of America, 68 Cal. 2d 822, 422 P.2d 377, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1968) (en banc),
in which the California Supreme Court vacated its original decision awarding forseeable consequential damages and failed to address the extracontracual damages issue in its final opinion.

damages in a contract action beyond 4policy
limits for forseeable
3
emotional distress 42 and economic lOSS.
Forseeability is an elastic concept that permits judges to reach
desired results without delineating specific reasons. 44 Early decisions
narrowly construed the concept in order to promote growth of the
new insurance industry.45 Insurance contracts were regarded as
strictly commercial in nature,' and courts propounded that the allowance of extracontractual damages would result in higher premiums to the public.4 7
Authorities, however, now reject such a protectionist position
toward the insurer because of evolutions in the social, economic, and
legal realities of the insurer-insured relationship.4 8 First, we are in a

consumerism age in which insurance companies are well-established,
economically powerful entities that affect every aspect of daily life.4 9
Second, in recognition that policyholders are not solely purchasing
pecuniary benefits, but also the peace of mind and the security of

prompt reimbursement in the event of loss,5 " insurance contracts are
now viewed as personal rather than strictly commercial in nature. 5 1
Third, insurance companies actively solicit reliance on the protection52
insureds purchase, and insureds justifiably rely on such protection.
Policyholders, therefore, should bear little risk of loss when the in-

surer breaches its promise of prompt payment, a risk which the insured can not provide for in the typical insurance contract of
adhesion. 3 Last, the argument that premiums will be increased as a
42. E.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967);
Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576 (1978). Cf. Eckenrode v.
Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1972) (strong dicta stating that mental distress
damages are recoverable in contract actions).
43. E.g., Asher v. Reliance Ins. Co., 308 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (applying Alaska
law); Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America, 59 Cal. Rptr. 724, 428 P.2d 860 (1967) (en banc),
vacated on other grounds, 68 Cal. 2d 822, 442 P.2d 377, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1968) (en banc);
Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576 (1978).
44. D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.3 (1973).
45. See notes 1, 2 and accompanying text supra. See also 46 CIN. L. REV., supra note 3,
at 174.
46. See, e.g., Leonard v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 100 Ga. App. 434, 111 S.E.2d 773 (1959);
Haas v. Pacific Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Ohio App. 332, 41 N.E.2d 263 (1941); Independent Grovery
Co. v. Sun Ins. Co., 146 Minn. 214, 178 N.W. 582 (1920).
47. See, e.g., Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bejcy, 201 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1953);
D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 262 Pa. Super. Ct. 331, 396 A.2d 780
(1978) (per curia-), petilionfor allowance of appealgranted, No. 119 (Pa. Mar. 28, 1978).
48. HASTINGS L.J., supra note 6, at 707-10. Accord 46 CIN. L. REV., supra note 3, at 17576.
49. See, e.g., notes 9, 34 & 35 supra
50. Hirsch, Carpenter & Carpenter, supra note 1, at 311.
51. Eg., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
Accord, 46 CIN. L. REV., supra note 3, at 173. Contra, Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980).
52. See Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367, 1369 (N.D.
Fla. 1976); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 404-5, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95
(1970); D'Ambrosio, supra note 47, at 342, 396 A.2d at 785-6 (dissenting opinion).
53. See note 52 supra.

result of extracontractual awards is not justified in light of the need
to balance the insurer-insured relationship.5 4 Extracontractual damages have long been imposed in third-party cases without any apparent increase in premiums to the public." There is no reason to
expect any different result if extracontractual awards are permitted
in first-party cases.
Consequently, to reflect the normative and economic concerns
of present day society, the flexible concept of forseeability is liberally
construed by expanding the range of forseeable consequences to include economic losses and mental distress. Since such recoveries are
nevertheless subject to the forseeability rule propounded by Hadley
v. Baxendale, some consequential and all punitive damages are still
considered too remote and unforseeable to be recoverable, thus making the contract action an incomplete remedy in many cases.
3. Allowance of Punitive Damages.-Contraryto the general

rule that punitive awards may not be granted in contract actions, a
handful of courts have awarded punitive damages for a malicious
breach of contract when an insurer's conduct shows malice, oppression, or heedless disregard of consequences.56 For example, South
Carolina permits exemplary awards for a breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, which apparently can be any misconduct
causing harm.57 The vast majority of jurisdictions, however, are reluctant to award punitive damages in a contract action, and do so
only if the breach of an insurance contract constitutes or is accompanied by an independent tort evidenced by an aggravating element
such as fraud, malice, or wanton disregard of an insured's rights.58
Since many jurisdictions are still reluctant in contract actions to
permit recovery of all consequential and punitive damages, the contract remedy is not the most desirable remedy from the insured's
standpoint, particularly when an insured suffers only emotional dis54. See note 52 supra.
55. 45 FORDHAM L. REV., supra note 6, at 168 n.25.
56. See Craft v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1978) (applying Indiana law); Rex Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 323 N.E.2d 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); Vernon Fire & Cas. v.
Sharp, 316 N.E.2d 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757,
527 P.2d 798 (1974). Cf Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 79 Mich._App. 639, 263
N.W.2d 258 (1978) (exemplary damages awarded because designed to compensate for injury to
feelings rather than to punish), rev'd, 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980) (exemplary award
reversed because such awards are not available for a breach of a commercial contract).
57. Eg., Felder v. Great Am. Co., 260 F. Supp. 575 (D.S.C. 1966); Corley v. Coastal
States Life Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 1, 135 S.E.2d 316 (1964); Hutcherson v. Pilgrim Ins. Co., 227 S.C.
239, 87 S.E.2d 685 (1955).
58. See, e.g., Short v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 307 F. Supp. 768 (W.D. Va. 1969);
Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of America, 265 Cal. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968); McIntosh
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 268 A.2d 518 (D.C. 1970); Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980); Diamond v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 Misc. 2d 528, 356
N.Y.S.2d 164 (1974).

tress or economic loss as a result of an insurer's wrongful failure to
pay.
III.

Tort Remedies

An insurer's wrongful refusal to pay insurance benefits is generally accompanied by tortious conduct independent of any breach of
contract. Accordingly, the most advantageous remedy for the insured is to institute a tort action concurrent with or in lieu of a contract action, because the tort remedy potentially provides the most
complete recovery for the injured policyholder.
It is well established that tort and contract liability may coexist. 59 In addition to the duties expressly created by contracting parties, the law imposes other duties upon the contractual relationship
that transcend the agreement itself.6° Accordingly, a breach of the
contractual duty to pay insurance benefits can, and often does, simultaneously result in a breach of a relational duty between the parties.
A.

Bene)ts of a Tort Action

The principle advantage of suing in tort is that the plaintiff is
more likely to recover extracontractual damages that are unavailable
in a contract action. 6 Punitive awards and damages for all injuries
that proximately follow tortious conduct may be recovered in a tort
action, regardless of forseeability.62 Contrarily, contract damages
are limited by the forseeability rule propounded by Hadley v. Bax63

endale.

While contract law protects the businessman's interests in order
to promote a favorable commercial climate, tort law recognizes the
simultaneous need of protecting the insured's interests. For example, the consumer has been afforded adequate protection from oppressive conduct by businessmen similarly situated as the insurer is
to the insured.' The expanded tort measure of damages addition59. Eg., Langdon & Sytsma, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and the PreAdjudicatory Role of the Insurance Company Advocate, 45 INS. COUNSEL J. 309, 310 (1978).
Courts unquestionably recognize that a breach of contract simultaneously can constitute a
violation of duty sounding in tort. See, e.g., Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1,
5 n.4 (1972); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78,
93 (1970); Collins v. Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Phila. 613, 615 (Pa. C.P. 1979).
60. See note 59 supra.
61. Eg., Mann & Keintz, JudicialApproaches to the Awarding of Extra-ContractDamagesfor Breach oInsurance Contracts, [1978] 661 INS. L.J. (CCH) 95, 96.
62. E.g., Holmes v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., - S.C. - 258 S.E.2d 924, 926 (1979);
Mann & Keintz, supra note 61, at 96.
63. See notes 22-28 and accompanying text supra.
64. 48 NOTRE DAME L. REv., supra note 6, at 1312-13. For example, bill collectors and
landlords have been held liable in tort for oppressive conduct upon consumers. See, e.g., Annot., Recovery by Tenant of Damagesfor Physical Injury or Mental Anguish Occasioned By
Wrongful Eviction, 17 A.L.R.2d 936 (1951). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46,

ally protects the policyholder with limited financial and legal resources by allowing him to redress all of his injuries when he would
otherwise be precluded from bringing suit because of the limited
contract recovery.6 5

Furthermore, tort actions deter future wrongful nonpayment by
insurers through awards of punitive and larger compensatory damages. 66 Without the added fear of larger and punitive assessments,

insurers have little to lose by delaying payment. 67 One claims manager for an insurance company has even admitted under oath that he
would continue to use tactics later found to be oppressive to settle

claims similar to the one for which his company was being sued.68
Since the scales traditionally have been tipped in favor of the
insurer, permitting a tort remedy best balances the conflicting interests of insurance companies and policyholders by allowing recoveries which more fully compensate loss and deter wrongful conduct.
For this reason, at least thirteen states69 provide one or more tort
remedies for insureds, despite critics' fears of punitive damage

awards.
B.

Criticisms of Punitive Damages

Because of the punishment and deterent effects of exemplary
damages, public policy mandates their award in tort actions when
fraudulent, malicious, oppressive, wanton, or reckless conduct is
present. 70 Nevertheless, many critics oppose exemplary damage
awards in the insurance context. One reoccurring argument is that

the allowance of such damages will result in the phenomenon known
as "runaway damages," which occurs when punitive damages unreasonably exceed the compensatory award. 7 ' Critics point to two reaat 49 (Appendix 1966) (listing of cases in which insurance adjusters and landlords used bully-

ing tactics).
65. 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV., supra note 6, at 1312-13.
66. Id
67. Id
68. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 392, 89 Cal. Rptr.
78, 87 (1970).
69. States providing tort remedies for insureds as of 1978 include Alabama, Arizona,
California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. Mann & Keintz, supra note 61, at 105 n.28.
70. E.g., J. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 1.34; Hirsch, Carpenter & Carpenter, supra note
1, at 325. The purpose of exemplary damages is to punish a defendant's tortious conduct in an
effort to deter repeat performances. Such damages are not intended to further compensate the
injured party. Punitive damages also serve as a warning to other members of the defendat's
class that wrongful conduct will not be tolerated in the future. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, Comment a (1979).
71. Eg., Hirsch, Carpenter & Carpenter, supra note 1, at 327-28. Critics have pointed to
apparent "runaway damages" in California as support for the theory that allowance of punitive awards will result in such a phenomenon. Nevertheless, the number of high punitive
awards in California is not increasing, and the California cases are not typical of the other
forty-nine states in which there are few, if any, "runaway damages" cases. Thornton & Blout,
Bad Faith and Insurers: Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 12 FORUM 699, 719 (1977). See

sons for the occurrence of "runaway damages"-juries and judges.
First, it is argued that juries vehemently focus upon the defendant's
conduct and turn their verdicts into "mad money."72 This reasoning,
however, fails to acknowledge that jury verdicts are subject to review
and reduction by trial judges for the very purpose of eliminating passionate verdicts." Moreover, many of these "passionate" cases
could be kept out of the hands of juries entirely by utilizing summary dispositions 74 or mandatory arbitration provisions in insurance
policies. 75 The second prong of the "runaway damages" argument is
that trial judges are failing to properly review jury verdict awards, to
properly instruct the jury, and to restrain inflamatory, prejudicial
closing arguments.7 6 While such error undoubtedly exists, there is
no evidence that this is a widespread problem.7 7 California is the
only state whose punitive awards have consistently been high in the
past, 78 and more recent decisions in California indicate that its
courts are imposing limits on extracontractual damage awards.79
Even when trial judges' conduct is in error, lower court decisions are
subject to review by the appellate courts, which have reduced punitive awards when necessary.80
also Kornblum, The Defense ofthe First PartyExtra-Contract Case: Strategy in Negotiations
and Discovery, 12 FORUM 721, 731-33 (1977) (appendix contains listing of early California
punitive awards cases).
72. Hirsch, Carpenter & Carpenter, supra note I, at 327-28. Some critics suggest that the
measure of punitive damages should be based upon the requested compensatory damages,
which indicate the hardship imposed upon the plaintiff. This suggestion, however, fails to
recognize the purpose of exemplary awards-punishment of the defendant. Accordingly, the
proper focus is solely upon the defendant's conduct. Id The assets of the insurance company,
rather than the plaintiffs loss, should be the determinative component in assessment of damages. Mann & Keintz, supra note 61, at 96. For example, a $200,000 punitive award has been
found reasonable against an insurance company with gross assets of $300,000,000 because such
an award represented less than a week's after-tax income of the insurance company. See
Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of America, 18 Cal. App. 3d 266, 270-71, 95 Cal. Rptr. 678, 681
(1971).
73. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 408-09, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78, 98-99 (1970) (court reviewed damages award and found it not to be excessive).
74. Kornblum, supra note 71, at 730.
75. Miller, Overview ofthe Problem of Bad Faith and Punitive Damages, 15 FORUM 194,
202 (1979).
76. Thornton & Blout, supra note 71, at 719. But see Comment, Recovery of Unlimited
InsuranceProceeds Through Punitive Damages Based Upon Bad Faith and Unfair Dealings, 5
U. SAN FERN. V. 367, 387-88 (1976), in which the writer alleges that many judges have limited
the full effectiveness of the punitive award by irrationally and illogically reducing punitive
awards in light of overwhelming evidence of wrongful conduct. The author claims that "[s]uch
decisions are akin to observing criminals in the act of outrageous conduct and releasing them
from the courtroom each time with a lecture instead of a fine or imprisonment." Id at 388.
77. See Thornton & Blout, supra note 71, at 719.
78. Id It should be noted that the seminal tort cases in the area of wrongful nonpayment
by insurers come for California. Thus, inexperience in dealing with new tort theories and
application of old tort theories to a new area of the law may account for some of the allegedly
excessive punitive awards in the early California decisions. Other states undoubtedly have
benefitted from California's experience.
79. See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 482 (1979).
80. E.g., id; Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 711 (1974). Silberg specifically addressed the "runaway damages" issue in California,

Critics further argue that punitive awards will result in higher
insurance rates to the public because insurers will be pressured into
paying claims that they otherwise might have contested."' Insurance
companies, however, are legally privileged to move against illegitimate claims in a permissible manner, even if it is likely that emotional distress may result to the insured. The insurer risks exemplary
awards only when he abuses his privilege, not when he exercises his
privilege reasonably. 82 Furthermore, extracontractual liability has
long been imposed in third-party insurance cases without any apparent increase in premiums.8 3
Another criticism leveled at punitive damages is that such
awards have the earmarkings of criminal fines and, therefore, the
defendant insurance company is entitled to the constitutional safeguards that attach to a criminal trial, such as higher burden of proof
standards.8 4 This argument has not been and can not be accepted in
light of the public policy that "the insured hold some leverage in the
relationship with the insurer. The possible assessment of punitive
damages helps to achieve some balance between the parties."8 5
Lastly, it has been suggested that punitive damages in the insurance context should not be awarded absent legislative mandate8 6
and, in fact, a few states have enacted statutory punitive awards.8
Nevertheless, courts should not be hesitant to punish tortious conduct when the legislatures fail to act, because public policy mandates
the protection of the policyholder's interests.8 8 Even in some of the
jurisdictions that have enacted punitive awards, the statutory award
is not the exclusive remedy.8 9
While awards of exemplary damages were initially discouraging
to the insurance business, industry officials have stated that they
"have learned to put the problem in proper perspective. . . . The
and warned that stricter controls would have to be placed on punitive awards if they were to
remain in insurance law.
81. Thornton & Blout, supra note 71, at 719; Weinstock, Good Faith in Insurance Contracts-A- Concept in Chaos, 24 Assoc. OF LIFE INS. COUNSEL 95, 110 (1976).
82. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 396, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 89
(1970). See generally, W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 98-99 (4th ed. 1971).
83. See note 55 and accompanying text supra
84. Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401,233 N.Y.S.2d 488, 179 N.E.2d 497 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Hirsch, Carpenter & Carpenter, supra note 1, at 325-26; Tasi, supra note 34, at

202-5; Weinstock, supra note 81, at Ill.
85. Hirsch, Carpenter & Carpenter, supra note 1, at 326.
86.

E.g., Farris v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 284 Or. 453, 587 P.2d 1015 (1978).

Two commentators have stated the punitive damages should not be awarded without the statutory or common-law safeguards of fraud, oppression, or malice. See Dubois & Bronson, 7he
Spectre ofPunitive Damages in First PartyActions, 40 INS. COUNSEL J. 290, 290-91 (1973).
87. See note 168 infra
88. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
89. See notes 187, 188 and accompanying text infra.

key . . . is having a valid defense." 9 Indeed, the key to avoiding
extracontractual liability entirely is for insurers to act reasonably
and in good faith.
C

General Theories of Liability

1. Fraud.-Perhapsthe earliest tort theory utilized by policyholders to recover extracontractual damages was fraud, which generally encompasses all acts, omissions, and concealments involving a
breach of duty that results in harm to another.9 1 An action for fraud
typically requires proof of five elements: (1) that a specific false representation of material fact was made; (2) that the party making such
representation knew it to be false, or made it recklessly without
proper knowledge; (3) that the representation was made with the intent to deceive and to induce reliance thereon; (4) that there was
justifiable reliance on the representation; and (5)92 that damages resulted to the party relying on the representation.
Insurance fraud actions for nonpayment can be classified into
two distinct groups-fraudulent inducement and fraudulent breach
of contract. The former ordinarily occurs during insurance solicitation when an insurer makes a representation with present intent not
to perform.9 3 Insureds, however, are rarely able to prove an insurer's
fraudulent intent at the time of contract formation, because intent
not to pay usually becomes apparent only after the fact.9 4 Unfortunately, proof of fraudulent intent at the time the claim arises is insufficient to support a fraud action. 95
The difficulty of proof has been lessened in jurisdictions that
follow the leading case of Wetherbee v. United Insurance Co. of
America,96 in which the court held that insureds could infer intent
not to perform an insurance policy from the insurer's subsequent
conduct. In Wetherbee, plaintiff requested a return of premiums and
cancellation of her health and accident insurance policy because she
feared that complete discretion to cancel her policy was vested in the
insurance company. The company assured plaintiff that her policy
could not be cancelled if she became disabled, and relying upon this
assurance, plaintiff purchased another policy. She subsequently suf90. Dillard, The Bomb Fell on Califomia--lntiveDamages, 22 Assoc. OF LIFE INS.
COUNSEL 965, 986 (1972).
91. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 1.16.
92. Id § 1.18; W. PROSSER, SUpra note 82, at 685-86; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 525 (1977).
93. E.g., Mann & Keintz, supra note 61, at 100; 45 FoRDHAM L. REV., supra note 6, at
171.

94.
95.
Haas v.
96.

See note 93 supra,
E.g., Old Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Woodall, 295 Ala. 235, 326 So. 2d 726 (1976);
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 70 Ohio App. 332, 41 N.E.2d 263 (1942).
265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968).

fered a permanently disabling stroke while the two policies were in
effect. After making payments under the policies for two years, the

insurance company terminated payments alleging that plaintiff was
not permanently disabled and confined to her home. In an action for
fraud and breach of contract, plaintiff recovered the unpaid benefits
and $200,000 in punitive damages. The court held that the insurer's
fraudulent intent not to carry out its assurances could be inferred
from the company's subsequent termination of benefits.97 For insureds, this relaxation of proof adds to the desirability of this type of

fraud action since it is easier to prevail.
Notwithstanding this relaxation of proof, there are several disadvantages to bringing a fraudulent inducement action. First, the
insured must still prove that the representation made at contract formation was false.9 8 Second, many states hedge the cause of action
with strict rules governing pleading and proof of facts.99 Third, this
action is not based on the abusive conduct that gave rise to the insured's grievance, but rather requires the insured to search for some
additional fraudulent action."c° Fourth, punitive damages may not
be recoverable if the court acknowledges the defense that this fraud
is actually a willful breach of contract.'
Last, while the insurer is

normally liable for all proximately resulting injuries in fraud actions,
some courts have refused attorney fees and emotional distress damages because the insured's detriment in these cases is measured by
02
the amount otherwise payable under the contract.
"Fraudulent breach of contract" occurs when a fraudulent act
accompanies the insurer's breach of contract.' 0 3 An action based
upon this fraud theory is preferable to fraudulent inducement because it allows recovery for all injury resulting from the insurer's
tortious conduct, including punitive damages, and is based directly
97. Id at 932, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 770. The Wetherbee standard was further relaxed by
Miller v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 331, 126 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1976). The court
held that fraudulent inducement can arise solely from the contractual promise contained in the
policy. Id Miller, however, was consistent with Wetherbee in that the fraud was inferred from
the insurer's subsequent conduct in processing the claim. The insurer improperly utilized physicians' answers to ambiguous questions as grounds for policy termination, and this practice
was undertaken without further notice to or inquiry of the physicians. Id
98. See, e.g., Old Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Woodall, 295 Ala. 235, 326 So. 2d 726 (1976);
Sharp v. Automobile Club, 225 Cal. App. 2d 648, 37 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1964).
99. See, e.g., Scafidi v. Western Loan & Bldg. Co., 72 Cal. App. 2d 550, 165 P.2d 260
(1946); Lascher, The Imposition oPunitive Damages in the Enforcement ofInsurance Contracts,
[19711 PRoc. ABA INs., NEG. & CoMp. L. 220, 222; Parks, supra note 6, at 47.
100. 45 FORDHAM L. REV., supra note 6, at 173.
101. Eg., Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America, 68 Cal. 2d 822, 442 P.2d 377, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 321 (1968) (en banc); Contractors Safety Ass'n v. California Comp. Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d
71, 307 P.2d 626 (1957); Parks, supra n.6, at 47.
102. Eg., Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of America, 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr.
764 (1968); Sharp v. Automobile Club, 225 Cal. App. 2d 648, 37 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1964); Parks,
supra n.6, at 48.
103. Mann & Keintz, supra note 61, at 101-02; 45 FoRDHm L. REv., supra note 6, at 17374.

on the conduct that gave rise to the injury.'

however, have accepted this

theory,10 5

Few jurisdictions,

perhaps because it muddles

the distinction between tort and contract by permitting both kinds of

recovery in one action."°n South Carolina, which loosely interprets

"fraudulent act" to mean any deceitful tactic by the insurer, is the
sole jurisdiction in which the fraudulent breach of contract theory
has been extensively used.' 7 Similar to other fraud actions, fraudulent breach of contract is subject to difficulties of proof and strict

rules governing its pleading.'o 8
Consequently, because of proof and pleading problems, muddling of legal theories, and general lack of acceptance, fraud theories
are generally less desirable to the insured when other tort remedies
are available.
2 IntentionalInfliction of EmotionalDistress.-The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is one of the most widely
utilized tort theories for recovery of extracontractual damages. 0 9
The generally accepted elements for this theory, which originate
from the Second Restatement of Torts, are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) the defendant's intention of

causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional
distress, (3) the plaintiffs suffering of extreme or severe distress, and
(4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the
defendant's outrageous conduct.110
In many cases, the extreme and outrageous character of the de104. See note 103 supra.
105. See Davenport v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 325 F.2d 785 (9th Cir.
1963) (applying Oregon law); Physicians Mut. Ins. Co. v. Savage, 296 N.E.2d 165 (Ind. App.
1973); Gavin v. North Carolina Mut. Ins. Co., 217 S.E.2d 591 (S.C. 1975).
106. 45 FORDHAM L. REV., supra note 6, at 174.
107. See, e.g., Corley v. Coastal States Life Ins. Co., 135 S.E.2d 316 (S.C. 1964); Blackmon
v. United Ins. Co., III S.E.2d 552 (S.C. 1959); Yarborough v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 81
S.E.2d 359 (S.C. 1954); Note, Pnitive DamagesforBreach of Contract in South Carolina, 10
S.C.L.Q. 444, 445 (1958). Other courts have permitted recoveries for fraudulent breach of
contract. See, e.g., Davenport v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 325 F.2d 785 (9th
Cir. 1963) (applying Oregon law); Physicians Mut. Ins. Co. v. Savage, 296 N.E.2d 165 (Ind.
App. 1973).
108. See note 99 supra
109. See, e.g., Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1970); Gilmore
v. Omaha Indemnity, 96 Cal. App. 3d 777, 158 Cal. Rptr. 229 (1979); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); World Ins. Co. v. Wright, 308 So.
2d 612 (Fla. 1975); Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care of Hosp. Serv. Corp., 29 I11.
App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 29 I11.2d 338, 356 N.E.2d 75
(1976); Amsden v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 203 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1972); Frishett v.
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 143 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. 1966); Hayes v. Aetna Fire
Underwriters, No. 14853 (Mont. March 18, 1980); Drake v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 236
N.W.2d 204 (Wis. 1975); J. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §§ 1.22-1.28; Keenan & Gillespie, The
Insurerand the Tort of the International [sic! Infliction ofMental Distress: Fletcher v. Western
NationalLife InsuranceCo., 39 INS. COUNSEL L.J. 335 (1972); 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV., supra
note 6.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). For cases adopting the Restatement
elements, see note 109 supra

fendant's conduct is in itself important evidence that severe distress
2
has existed. II Moreover, the outrageous character of the conduct"1
can be inferred from the abuse of a position of actual or apparent
authority to affect another's interests," 3 or from the knowledge that
another is particularly susceptible to emotional distress. ' ' Either inference is usually available in the insurance context because insurers
can easily abuse their advantageous position of power that derives
from their superior economic position and use of adhesion contracts.
Courts recognize that insurers know or should know that insureds

are in an emotionally vulnerable position when they file a claim" 15
and, thus, the nature of the insurance relationship often leads to recoveries against insurance companies for conduct that would not be
considered outrageous if committed by another."t 6 Accordingly, the
tort theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress is particularly applicable when oppressive settlement tactics by insurance
companies result in emotional distress." 7
The first case to award damages for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in an insurance context was Fletcher v.
Western NationalLife Insurance Co., 8 in which plaintiff purchased
a disability insurance policy that provided benefits for two years in

case of sickness and for thirty years for permanent disability. After
suffering a severe, disabling back injury in an accident at work,
Ill. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment j (1965).
112. Extreme and outrageous conduct is "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id, Comment d.
113. Id, Comment e.
114. Id, Comment f.
115. E.g., Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1970); Fletcher v.
Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
116. See, e.g., Keenan & Gillespie, supra note 109, at 345.
117. One writer has questioned whether liability for intentional infliction of emotional
distress can be extended to the insurer's employees and attorneys, and whether insurers can be
held liable for such distress to third parties who have observed the insurer's outrageous conduct. See Parks, supra note 6, at 51-2. While there is no case law directly on point, both
questions probably can be answered in the affirmative. Liability is imposed for intentional or
reckless misconduct, for which employees and attorneys can be held personally liable along
with the insurer. Id Cf. Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968)
(attorney's liability in third party actions). Moreover, the Second Restatement of Torts states,
Where [extreme and outrageous] conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is
subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress (a)
to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the time, whether or
not such distress results in bodily harm, or (b) to any other person who is present at
the time, if such distress results in bodily harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). But cf. Owens v. Childrens Memorial Hosp.,
347 F. Supp. 663 (D. Neb. 1972) aft'd, 480 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1973) (recovery denied for
emotional distress with resulting physical harm to mother who witnessed the prolonged death
of her daughter due to the alleged negligence of defendant). While it is difficult to imagine a
case in which an insurance company would intentionally direct outrageous conduct at a third
party, it is foreseeable that an insurer may or should know the substantial probability of its
outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress to a third party who has witnessed such
conduct.
118. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).

plaintiff filed a claim and began receiving disability payments. Despite the unanimous opinion of physicians to the contrary, the insurer concluded that plaintiff's disability resulted from an unknown
congenital spinal defect and, therefore, terminated the benefits under
the rationale that plaintiff had misrepresented his true medical condition on his application for insurance. Prior to terminating benefit
payments, the insurer had initiated a deliberate campaign employing
threatening and false communications for the purpose of forcing the
insured to forfeit his policy or disadvantageously settle a non-exis-

tent dispute. Plaintiff brought an action against the insurer for intentional infliction of emotional distress and was awarded both
compensatory and punitive damages. The California Court of Appeals held that the insurer's threatened and actual bad faith refusals
to make payments in concert with false and threatening communications were sufficient grounds to find intentional infliction of emotional distress." 9 Adopting the Restatement elements for the tort,'2 °
the Fletcher court emphasized plaintiffs susceptibility to emotional
21
distress and the insurer's abuse of its position of authority.'
Another case which further illustrates the tort defined by
Fletcher is Eckenrode v. Life ofAmerica Insurance Co. 122 in which
plaintiff was the beneficiary of her deceased husband's life insurance
policy. In an attempt to coerce a settlement of the claim fied by the
wife, the insurance company contrived a defense and excessively
delayed payment in light of its knowledge that plaintiff needed the
benefits to support her family.' 23 After first disposing of the criticisms of other courts that have refused to recognize the emotional
distress tort in various areas of the law, 124 the United States Court of
119. Id at 390, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
120. See note 110 and accompanying text supra.
121. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 394-404, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 88-95. Some commentators have
criticized Fletcher, alleging that plaintiffs mental distress did not meet the severity standard
required for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Keenan & Gillespie,
supra note 109, at 341. Contra Levin & Chapman, Insurance Company's Liabilityfor "Oppressive Conduct," 1973 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 374, 382 (1973). Nevertheless, it should be noted that
the severity of the distress can be shown by the outrageous character of the insurer's conduct.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment j (1965).
122. 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972).
123. The insurer had sent one letter to plaintiff suggesting that "in view of a police investigation not likely to be completed until the 'very distant future,' plaintiff might like to suggest
an offer to 'settle' rather than wait for the police report." Id at 3 n.2.
124. Examining the rationales frequently given for refusing to recognize the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Eckenrode court cogently recognized their lack of
foundation. First, the court observed that pain, suffering and mental distress have long been
elements of damages in other tort actions for which we determine a monetary value and, thus,
mental disturbance is not incapable of financial measurement. Second, the court noted that
mental consequences are not too evanescent for the law to deal with, because modem medicine
now acknowledges that emotions can result in harm to an individual. Third, the court dismissed the argument that the "new tort" would lead to frivolous claims, because triers of fact
are capable of distinguishing such claims from valid claims, as already is done in other areas of
tort law without serious difficulty. Finally, as to the argument that mental consequences vary
greatly with each individual so as to present insurmountable difficulties for the law, the court

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted the principles propounded
by Fletcher and reversed the district court's judgment dismissing
plaintiffs cause of action. 25 The court noted that the insurer used
"economic coercion" to force a settlement, and that such conduct
was clearly outrageous. The coercion was accomplished by delaying
and refusing payment, thereby increasing plaintiffs financial distress, and it was aimed at the very thing insured against-the economic and mental welfare of the beneficiary upon the death of the
insured. 26 The court also based its decision upon the implied good
faith and fair dealing conditions in insurance contracts, and the public interest that the insurance industry "is stamped with."' 27 An intentional infliction of emotional distress action is advantageous to an
insured because, contrary to fraud actions, no corroborating property or economic loss is required to recover mental distress damages,' 28 and punitive damages are readily awarded in most
jurisdictions.' 2 9 This theory further avoids both the procedural difficulties encountered in fraud actions and the need to relate proof
back to the time of contract formation. 3 ° Once an insured has established a prima facie case, it is very difficult for the defendantinsurer to justify his actions. '3'
Problems of proof, however, may be one difficulty confronting
the insured who brings an emotional distress action. Since the tort is
designed to redress invasions of emotional tranquility, courts may
require a strict showing that the distress suffered was in fact severe. 132 Moreover, because economic coercion can be applied in a
subtle, business-like manner, proof of the insurer's wrongdoing may
be impossible. 3 Another disadvantage of this tort remedy is that
some jurisdictions may deny recovery for economic loss under the
rationale that the tort is fundamentally designed to redress invasions
of emotional tranquility. 3 Jurisdictions also have refused to recognize the tort altogether out of concerns that it would promote fictistated that the objective standard of a reasonable man is satisfactory for dealing with the variances between individuals. Id at 3.
125. Id at 4-5.
126. Id
127. Id at 5.
128. E.g., Note, First Party Torts-ExtraContractualLiability of Insurers Who Violate the
Duty of GoodFaithand FairDealing, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 900, 914 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
25 DRAKE L. REV.].

129.

Id Cf.Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972) (held that

punitive damages were not recoverable because compensatory damages were sufficiently puni-

tive).
130.
131.

Lascher, supra note 99, at 223,
25 DRAKE L. REV., supra note 128, at 914.

132. 45 FORDHAM L. REV., supra note 6, at 176-77. But see note 28 and accompanying
text supra.
133. Lascher, supra note 99, at 222.
134. 45 FORDHAM L. REV., supra note 6, at 176-77.

tious claims and litigation of bad manners and trivialities.'
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Despite any disadvantages, the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress provides substantial, if not complete, redress of an
insured's injuries from nonpayment. Consequently, this tort action
has become a widely used legal basis for bringing claims to compensate insureds for wrongful refusals to pay.
3.

IntentionalInterference with a ProtectedPropertyInterest.-

The tort of intentional interference with a protected property interest
is essentially an offshoot of the intentional infliction of emotional
distres theory propounded in Fletcher v. Western NationalLife Insurance Co. 136 While no court has delineated the elements of a prima
facie case, commentators have speculated that the elements would
include the following: (1) intentional, outrageous, non-privileged
conduct; (2) for the purpose of causing its insured to surrender his
policy or compromise a claim on the basis of a non-existent (created)

dispute; (3) that proximately results in a loss to the plaintiff (presumably by giving up valuable coverage or benefits).' 37 The Fletcher
court actually proposed this cause of action as an alternative to intentional infliction of emotional distress, because the latter is

designed primarily to remedy invasions of emotional tranquility,
whereas invasions of economic interests often dominate in wrongful
nonpayment cases. Intentional interference with a protected property interest places the emphasis where it belongs and permits recovery of all proximately caused detriment in one action. This was
perceived by the Fletcher court as being preferable to straining the
38
emotional distress tort to achieve the same result.
Notwithstanding the benefit of potential recovery for all injuries
sustained by the insured, intentional interference with a protected
property interest has not been adopted by any court; it has been
135. See, e.g., D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 262 Pa. Super. Ct.
331, 396 A.2d 780 (1978) (per curiam),petitionfor allowance of appealgranted, No. 119 (Pa.
Mar. 28, 1979). See also Smith, The Status of the Tort of Outrageas It Exists Today in Alabama and OtherJurisdictions,39 ALA. LAW. 568 (1978). But cf. W. PROSSER, supra note 82, at
51. Prosser notes that the fear of a multitude of fictitious claims is a poor reason for denying
recovery for a genuine, serious mental injury because "[i]t is the business of the law to remedy
wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a 'flood of litigation.'" Id Prosser additionally
comments on two other criticisms of intentional infliction of emotional distress: that such
damages are difficult to measure, and that mental consequences lie outside the boundaries of
any reasonable, proximate connection with the defendant's act. Concerning the former, Prosser observes that mental suffering is scarcely more difficult to prove or estimate than the pain
resulting from a physical injury such as broken leg, which never has been denied compensation. Id at 50. He asserts that the latter criticism is unfounded because nearly all courts have
abandoned forseeability as the sole criterion of legal cause. Moreover, medical science has
long recognized that emotions often produce marked changes in or physical harm to the body.
Id at 50-1.
136. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
137. See Parks, supra note 6, at 52-3.
138. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 402, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 94
(1970).

merely discussed summarily by three courts. 3' 9 This lack of popularity is presumably due to the development of the bad faith tort, whose
standards of proof are much less burdensome than the standards re-

quired to recover for intentional interference with a protected property interest. 4 0 Accordingly, it is doubtful that this tort will ever

become a viable remedy for insureds.
4. Bad Faith.-Perhapsthe most volatile and fertile area of

first-party extracontractual insurance law concerns the tort of bad
faith, which offers insureds the most promising theory of recovery
because it was created and molded specifically to redress insurance

companies' wrongful delays and refusals to pay legitimate insurance
claims. The bad faith tort relies upon the premise that the law implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract,
thereby imposing a duty on each party not to interfere with the right
of the other party to receive the benefits of the agreement. 4 ' Thus,
insurers have a good faith duty not to withhold insurance benefits
maliciously or without probable cause. 42 While courts have not delineated the specific elements of this cause of action, commentators
have proposed the following: (1) the absence of a reasonable basis
for denying benefits, and (2) the denial of benefits with knowledge or
43
reckless disregard that such denial was without reasonable basis.
The landmark case recognizing the tort of bad faith in a firstparty action was Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., '44 in which the
139. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970);
Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan For Hosp. Care of Hosp. Serv. Corp., 29 Ill. App. 3d 339, 330
N.E.2d 540 (1975), rev'don other grounds, 64 Ill. 2d 338, 356 N.E.2d 75 (1976).
140. See 45 FORDHAM L. REV., supra note 6, at 177 n.92.
141. See, e.g., Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198,
201 (1958); Diamon v. Penn Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 534, 552, 372 A.2d 1218,
1227 (1977).
142. Eg., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr.
482 (1979). Some courts have recognized a statutory duty of good faith in insurance contracts,
which is the basis for recognizing the tort of bad faith in these jurisdictions. See, e.g., First
Security Bank of Bozeman v. Goddard, - Mont. - 593 P.2d 1040 (1979). Other courts,
however, have held that the duty of good faith arises only when a fiduciary relationship exists
between the insurer and insured, such as in third-party liability claims. Thus, these latter
courts have held that there is no general implied duty of good faith in first-party insurance
contracts upon which to base an action for bad faith. See, e.g., Baxter v. Royal Indem. Co.,
285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. D. Ct. App. 1973), cert. discharged, 317 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1975); Lawton v.
Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576 (1978); Craig v. Iowa Kemper Mut.
Ins. Co., 565 S.W.2d 716 (Mo. 1978). Cf. Leonard v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 100 Ga. App. 434, 11i
S.E.2d 773 (1959) (insurance contracts are not among those classes of contracts from which can
be implied a public duty, the breach of which will support a tort action).
143. E.g., 46 CIN. L. REV., supra note 3, at 185; 45 Mo. L. REV., supra note 6, at 113-14.
Cf. 45 FORDHAM L. REV., supra note 6, at 180, which states that the elements of the bad faith
tort are as follows: (1) economic loss or compounded physical injuries, (2) proximately caused
by the insurer's unreasonable delay, and (3) aggravated by circumstances that evidence a bad
faith intent to deprive the insured of his rights under the policy.
144. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973). Cf. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v.
Superior Ct. of Butte County and Keoppel, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842

policyholder alleged that three insurers willfully and maliciously entered into a scheme to deprive him of the benefits of the fire insurance policies he held on his restaurant. The insurers encouraged the
institution of criminal charges against the insured by falsely implying that he had a motive for arson. The insurers then raised plaintiff's failure to submit to examination under oath while the charges
were pending as an excuse to deny coverage. Plaintiff brought suit
claiming compensatory and punitive damages for emotional distress,
and the Supreme Court of California found a cause of action in tort
against the insurers for breach of their implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing.'4 5 The Gruenberg court first examined California
cases in which the insurer had been held liable for failing to accept a
reasonable settlement within policy limits, and determined that the
underlying rationale of these decisions was the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing. In comparing the third-party cases to the case
at bar, the court determined that the same duty was applicable to all
contracts of insurance, and that the duties to accept reasonable settlements and to act reasonably in handling claims were merely aspects of the same duty of good faith and fair dealing. 41 6 Recognizing
that the good faith duty permeates insurance contracts because of the
personal relationship between the insurer and the insured, the court
found that the great disparity in bargaining positions of the parties
and the insurer's traditional role as protector of the insured heightened the company's duty to act in good faith.'4 7 Since the insurance
industry alleviates society of the burdens which insurance provides
for, the insurance industry is affected with a public interest and,
therefore, insurers have a legal responsibility to perform their contracts in good faith.' 4 8
Critics have attacked the bad faith tort theory as being too nebulous because of the fine line between tortious and nontortious conduct.'4 9 Although the existence of bad faith must presently be
determined on a case by case basis, a number of factors indicative of
bad faith have long been applied by courts in third-party cases and,
more recently, in first-party cases. 150 In general, the duty of good
(1979) (California expanded bad faith doctrine to third-party claimant actions based upon
California's Unfair Practices Act of the Insurance Code); Comment, A Statutory Actionfor
Insurer Bad Faith-The Reasonably Clear Remedyfor the Third Party Clainant, 11 PAC. L.J.
945 (1980) (discusses California's expansion of the bad faith tort).
145. 9 Cal. 3d at 575, 510 P.2d at 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
146. Id at 573, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
147. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 404, 89 Cal. Rptr.
78, 95 (1970); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 434, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 19 (1967).
148. See note 147 supra
149. Id
150. Circumstances indicative ot bad faith include the following: breaching the duty to
advise an insured to retain private counsel; not approaching settlement as if the policy had no
limits regarding the amount of coverage; adamantly refusing to enter into serious negotiations;

faith and fair dealing is judged by a reasonable man standard. Juries have had no more difficulty in recognizing the bad faith insurer
than in recognizing the reasonably prudent man in negligence actions. I"
Under the bad faith tort theory, the insured need only prove the
insurer's breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a
showing of misconduct easier to sustain than that required under
other tort theories. 5 2 And unlike fraud actions, the analysis centers3
upon the specific conduct that caused the detriment to the insured.
The insured likewise need not prove "outrageous" conduct and "severe" distress, which are the higher burdens of proof required in an
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.' 5 4 Even when
mental distress cannot be established, the insured is not precluded
from recovering compensatory and punitive damages in a bad faith
action. 55 Another major benefit of the bad faith tort theory is that
all types of extracontractual damages are recoverable.1 56 The only
limitation on damages is that corroborating evidence of property or
economic loss must be shown before mental suffering damages can
be recovered but, typically, such a showing need only be minimal. 57
As with all tort actions, punitive damages are readily recoverable
upon a showing of, inter alia, wilfulness or maliciousness.15 8
While only a few courts have adopted the bad faith tort,' 59 it
improperly investigating or evaluating a claim; failing to forsee a claimant's probable excess
verdict; failing to disclose policy limits; failing to disclose settlement opportunities to an insured; ignoring settlement advice or following advice not to settle; demanding that an insured
contribute to settlement; erroneously denying coverage; and refusing to defend. See J. McCARTHY, supra note 6, §§ 2.13-2.23; 45 FoRD-Am L. REV. supra note 6, at 181.
151. Eg., 46 CIN. L. REV., supra note 3, at 187; 25 DRAKE L. REV., supra note 128, at 914;
45 FORDHAM L. REV., supra note 6, at 180. Because of the nature of the insurer's duty to the
insured, some authorities have suggested that the insurer's conduct be measured by the standard of an expert in the field of litigation, ie., the insurer should be held to the professional
standard of an attorney. Accordingly, the insurer must regard the insured's interests equally as
or more important than its own interests in deciding whether or not to pay benefits. Eg.,
Keenan & Gillespie, supra note 109 at 340.
152. See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 482 (1979); 45 FoRDnHA L. REV., supra note 6, at 179-80.
153. 45 FORDHAM L. REV., supra note 6, at 180.
154. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 578-80, 510 P.2d 1032, 104142, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480, 489-90 (1973).
155. Id
156. Id
157. Id Corroborating evidence of property or economic loss is required in order to guarantee that the emotional distress is serious and not feigned. See Parks,supra note 6, at 56 n.65.
158. Austero v. National Cas. Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 1, 148 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1978); Egan v.
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 63 Cal. App. 3d 659, 133 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1976).
159. See, e.g., Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr.
389 (1978); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973); Grand Sheet Metal Prod. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. Super. Ct. 46, 375
A.2d 428 (1977); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d 1070
(1975); Frizzy Hairstylists, Inc. v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 89 Misc. 2d 822, 392 N.Y.S.2d 554
(1977); Christian v. American Home Assurance Corp., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977). See also
Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan For Hosp. Care of Hosp. Serv. Corp., 29 Ill. App. 3d 339, 330
N.E.2d 540 (1975), rev'don othergrounds, 64 IU.2d 338, 356 N.E.2d 75 (1976). But cf Urfer v.

appears inevitable that most jurisdictions will recognize the tort as
the most effective means of protecting the insured's interests from
wrongful and tortious refusals to make insurance payments.
5. Strict Liability.-The strict liability theory, which was
adapted from the products liability field, imposes extracontractual
liability on an insurer for rejecting a claim without a good faith belief in its validity, regardless of whether the insurer acted intentionally in bad faith, negligently, or otherwise culpably.' 6" Some of the
benefits that proponents of this theory suggest will result are the
complete relief for policyholders from insurers' misconduct, a reduction of litigation between insureds and insurance companies, and a
decrease in time and costs of handling claims. 6
Some writers advocate that strict liability is necessary to motivate insurers to deal fairly and in good faith with insureds, because
proof of outrageous or abusive conduct requires an almost insurmountable burden. 62 But while one court has found merit in the
strict liability theory 16 3 and another has suggested that it will consider the theory's future adoption,'" no court has formally adopted
strict liability in the insurance context.' 65 There is concern that its
adoption would unnecessarily tip the scales in favor of the insured
rather than balance the inequities present in the insurer-insured relationship. Authorities note the importance of preserving the investigatory powers of the insurance industry while not overcompensating
for the insureds' interests. 166 Consequently, it is doubtful that this
theory will be embraced by courts, unless judicial or legislative remedies fail to effectively protect insureds' interests.
IV.

167
Statutory Remedies

Alternative to the judicial approaches are the statutes which
County Mut. Ins. Co., 60 IUl. App. 3d 469, 376 N.E.2d 1073 (1978) (refused to follow
Ledingham); Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha, 56 Ill. App. 3d I11, 371 N.E.2d 373 (1978) (refused
to follow Ledngham).
160. E.g., J. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 2.9.
161. See Comment, Approaching Strict Liability of nsurerfor Refusing to Settle Within
Policy Limits, 47 NEB. L. REv. 705, 719 (1968).
162. Hirsch, Carpenter & Carpenter, supra note 1, at 331-37.
163. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 431, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 17 (1967).
164. Koppie v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 210 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Iowa 1976).
165. See Kavanaugh v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1971)
(strong dictum); Fulton v. Woodward, 545 P.2d 979 (Ariz. App. 1976); Johansen v. California
State Auto. Ass'n, 41 Cal. App. 3d 974, 116 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1974); Welbom v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 260 So. 2d 229 (Fla. D. Ct. App. 1972); Koppie v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 210
N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1976).
166. E.g., 46 CIN. L. REV., supra note 3, at 191.
167. This analysis examines statutes which provide compensation for general categories of
insurance misconduct. The discussion does not examine insurance statutes which apply to

some states have enacted to provide compensation to insureds for

wrongful delays and refusals to pay insurance benefits.
A.

Statutory Approaches

While no two penalty statutes for insurers' nonpayment are
alike, there are at least fourteen existing statutes
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that can be de-

scribed generally with respect to two major characteristics: scope
and exclusiveness.
1. Scope.-State penalty statutes commonly specify that all
types of insurance contracts are subject to the regulations imposed
by statute. 69 Three states, however, limit the applicability of their
statutes to certain lines of insurance. For example, Idaho, the least
restrictive state, excludes only surety bonds from the coverage of its
statute.' 70 On the other hand, Oklahoma is the most restrictive state
since its statute applies only to accident and health contracts.17 1 The
provisions to life, acciremaining state, Texas, restricts its statutory
172
dent, and health insurance contracts.
As for the behavior proscribed, seven states impose penalties on

insurers for unjustifiable failure to pay benefits within a specified
time period after the filing of a claim.' 73 The time period during
which benefits must remain unpaid before the insurer is liable range
from thirty days to six months, except in Arkansas where the time
limit must be specified in the insurance policy.' 74 In four other
states, a penalty is mandated if an insurer fails to pay benefits within
a specified time period and the insurer misbehaves.' 75 Misconduct
very limited areas of insurance, such as no-fault auto insurance. Nor does it examine statutes
which do not provide an individual cause of action for insureds.
168. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-3238; 66-324 (1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.428 (West 1972);
GA. CODE ANN. § 56-1206 (1977); IDAHO CODE § 41-1839 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73,
§ 767 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-256 (1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 22:656, 22:657, 22:658 (West 1978 & Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. ,§ 375.296, 375.420
(Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-359 (1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36,
§ 1219 (West 1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.114 (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-12-3
(1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1105 (1968); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.62, 3.62-1 (Vernon
1963).
169. See Keintz & Mann, Extra-ContractDamagesforBreach ofInsurance Contracts;The
Statutory/Approach, [1978] 660 INS. L. J. (CCH) 7, 13. For a summary of the fourteen state
penalty statutes' contents, see the chart found in Keintz & Mann. Id at 10-11.
170. IDAHO CODE § 41-1839 (1977).
171. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1219 (West 1976).
172. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.62, 3.62-1 (Vernon 1963).
173. The states in which failure to pay benefits within a specified time period is proscribed
by statute are Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3238 (1966) (specified in policy); Florida, FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 627.428 (West 1972) (60 days); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 41-1839 (1977) (30 days
after proof of loss); Louisiana (health & accident insurance), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22:656,
22:657, 22:658 (West 1978 & Supp. 1980) (respectively 60 days, 30 days, & 60 days); Oklahoma
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1219 (West 1976) (30 days); and Texas, TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art.
3.62, 3.62-1 (Vernon 1963) (respectively 30 days & 60 days).
174. See note 173 supra.
175. The states whose statutes require misconduct in concert with nonpayment of benefits

under these statutes includes bad faith conduct in Georgia and Tennessee; vexatious conduct without reasonable cause in Missouri; and
conduct that is arbitrary, capricious, without just cause, or without
probable cause in Louisiana.' 7 6 The last general category of proscribed behavior is the witholding of payments without justification,
and four state statutes prohibit this conduct.' 7 7 These latter statutes
do not prescribe a time period in which nonpayment must persist,
and the particular behavior delineated is written in broad, vague language' 7 8 that has been variously interpreted.17 9
Typical statutory penalties consist of attorney fees, interest on
the claim, or an amount in addition to the claim. All fourteen states,
except Tennessee, explicitly provide for "reasonable attorney
fees." ' Tennessee case law, however, allows attorney fees provided
that they do not exceed the penalty amount under the applicable
state statute.18 ' Reasonable attorney fees are determined by the
courts and depend upon such factors as the difficulty of the case, the
time spent, and the skill required.' 82 Supplementing attorney fees,
six state statutes award a penalty amount beyond the claim plus interest.8 3 Such awards are generally limited to a maximum percentage of the claim, and range from ten percent to twenty-five
percent.' 8 4
within a specified period of time are Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 56-1206 (1977); Louisiana
(insurance other than health & accident), LA. REV. STAT. §§ 22:656, 22:657, 22:658 (West 1978
& Supp. 1980); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 375.296, 375.420 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1980);
and Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1105 (1968).
176. See note 175 supra
177. The states that proscribe the withholding of payments without justification are Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-3238; 66-3243 (1966); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 767
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 40-256 (1973); and South Dakota,S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-12-3 (1978).
178. For example, both the Illinois and South Dakota statutes specify that the refusal to
pay must be "vexatious" or "without reasonable cause." See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 767
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-12-3 (1978).
179. See 3 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 357-60 (1945). "Vexatious refusal" has been interpreted to include, inter alia, ceasing periodic payments without notice,
denial of liability without stating reasons, use of nonmeritorious claims, litigating a defense
which has been held invalid, and failing to furnish an insured with the proper forms to file a
claim. Id The Kansas statute states that insurers who fail to pay "without just cause or excuse" will be held liable. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-256 (1973). The behavior outlined in the
Arkansas statute as subjecting insurers to liability is mere failure to pay benefits within a reasonable time or the time specified in the insurance policy. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-3238,
66-3243 (1968).
180. See note 168 supra.
181. See New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Shields, 155 F. 54 (6th Cir. 1907) (interpreting Tennessee law).
182. Keintz & Mann, supra note 169, at 14.
183. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-3238, 66-3243 (1966) (respectively 12% and equal to benefits
if $300 or less); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-1206 (1977) (not more than 25%); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 22:657, 22:658 (West 1978 & Supp. 1980) (respectively double the benefits under the contract during the delay, and 12%); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.296 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1980)
(10%); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1105 (1968) (not to exceed 25%); TEX. INs. CODE ANN. art.
3.62, 3.62-1 (Vernon 1963) (12% & 12%).
184. See note 183 supra.

2. Exclusiveness.-An important aspect of state penalty statutes is whether they represent the sole remedy afforded the insured
with respect to an insurer' failure to pay benefits. Georgia and Loui-

siana are apparently the only states whose courts have held that their
statutes provide the exclusive award for nonpayment of insurance
benefits.' 85 The Oregon and Texas Supreme Courts have similarly
held that their unfair insurance practices acts provide exclusive remedies and do not create a basis upon which to recover punitive damages in an independent tort action.' 86 Contrarily, a California Court
of Appeals upheld the right of a third-party claimant to directly sue
a tortfeasor's insurer based upon a violation of the California unfair
insurance practices act. 187 The remaining states have not ruled on
the exclusiveness of their statutes. 18 8
B.

Pros and Cons of the Statutory Remedy

Insurers traditionally have opposed the imposition of penalty
statutes, presumably because of the favorable treatment originally
afforded insurers under the common law. 189 These attitudes will undoubtedly change in light of recent, large tort damage awards and
the limitations on recoverable damages that most statutes provide. 190
From the insured's standpoint, the merits of the statutory remedy are essentially twofold. Penalty statutes increase an insurance

company's risk of loss potential on individual policies, thereby causing a more careful company evaluation of claims in respect to possible litigation.'' Moreover, while the immediate effect of a penalty
statute is an increase in litigation, a decrease in litigation ultimately
will result because insurers tend to settle disputed claims more rapi92
dly. 1

The major drawback of penalty statutes from the insured's
185. See American Reliable Ins. Co. v. Woodward, 143 Gal. App. 652, 239 S.E.2d 543
(1977); Woodward v. Prudential Ins. Co., 350 So. 2d 948 (La. App. 1977); Bye v. American
Income Life Ins. Co., 316 So. 2d 164 (La. App. 1975).
186. Farris v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 284 Or. 453, 587 P.2d 1015 (1978); Lone
Star Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 574 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. 1978).
187. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr.
842 (1979).
188. Illinois and Minnesota courts have inconsistently decided cases which have dealt
with the exclusiveness of remedies for insurers' nonpayment. See Debolt v.-Mutual of Omaha,
56 Ill. App. 3d 111, 371 N.E.2d 373 (1978) (held that Illinois provides an exclusive remedy by
statute); Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan For Hosp. Care of Hosp. Serv. Corp., 29 Ill. App. 3d
339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (1975), rev'don other grounds, 64 Ill. 2d 338, 356 N.E.2d 75 (1976) (held
that a tort action may be brought in Illinois regardless of statute); Haagenson v. National
Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co., 277 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1979) (held that an intentional
breach of a statutorily mandated contract is not a tort where statute provides a remedy); Olson
v. Rugloski, 227 N.W.2d 385 (Minn. 1979) (held that tort action could not be brought for
breach of contract unless accompanied by an independent, willful tort).
189. 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV., supra note 6, at 1313.
190. See 10 WM. & MARY L. REV., supra note 17, at 469. See note 168 supra.
191. 10 WM. & MARY L. REV., supra note 17, at 469.
192. Id

standpoint is that they provide an upper limit to the amount of damages recoverable and, thus, an insured may not receive adequate
93
compensation. 1
Because penalty statutes ordinarily limit any potential recovery,
an exclusive statutory remedy is less satisfactory to an aggrieved insured than the tort remedies of bad faith and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. This deficiency, however, can be remedied by
permitting insureds to bring tort actions concurrent with or based
upon unfair insurance practices acts that explicitly delineate the conduct for which an insurer can be held liable.
V.

The Pennsylvania Experience

Extracontractual liability against insurance companies is a recent phenomenon in Pennsylvania that is in a state of flux because of
a lack of appellate direction. "[A] plaintiiff's right to recover for his
or her insurance company's wrongful and malicious refusal to pay a
proper claim depends entirely upon which judge. . . is assigned to
decide defendant's pretrial motions."' 9 4 Nevertheless, a more than
sufficient framework exists in Pennsylvania for recognizing extracontractual liability theories. Pennsylvania's unfair insurance practices
statute sets forth excellent guidelines for establishing a private cause
of action because it extensively delineates the conduct for which an
insurer is liable. Moreover, a cause of action against insurers for
intentional infliction of emotional distress could be readily adopted
because Pennsylvania already recognizes the tort in analogous
breach of contract situations. Finally, Pennsylvania has long implied a duty of good faith in insurance contracts, which is the basis
needed for the tort of bad faith. Pennsylvania, therefore, appears
destined to follow the lead of California and other states in formulating adequate remedies to protect insureds' interests from wrongful
refusals to pay insurance benefits. At a minimum, Pennsylvania policyholders would benefit from adoption of the tort theories of bad
faith and intentional infliction of emotional distress in the insurance
context.
A.

Tort Recoveries In Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania courts are currently in a state of chaos with respect to extracontractual liability because they are being inundated
with novel tort actions designed to recover damages beyond policy
amounts from insurers who wrongfully withold benefits.' 9" Lower
193. Id
194. O'Neill v. Keystone, 11 Pa. D. & C.3d 600, 603 (C.P. Phila. County 1979).
195. E.g., Collins v. Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Phila. 613, 617 (Pa. C.P. 1979). See also
notes 238 & 246 infra

court decisions are inconsistent because of little guidance from the
appellate courts. 19 6 The seminal Pennsylvania appellate decision,
D 'mbrosio v. Pennsylvan a National Mutual Casualty Insurance
Co., 197 is at odds with Pennsylvania case law dealing with emotional
distress in similar contexts. 98 The case also fails to directly confront
the issue of whether a cause of action in tort lies against an insurer

for mental distress and economic loss caused by wrongful refusal to
pay a legitimate claim. 19 9 While the Commonwealth has yet to
adopt an extracontractual tort theory, Justice Spaeth's dissenting
opinion in D'mbrosio clearly and cogently acknowledges the
proper foundation in Pennsylvania for recognizing the torts of bad
faith and intentional inffiction of emotional distress.
In D'Ambrosio, plaintiff filed an $832.23 claim with defendant
for the damages that plaintiffs boat sustained in a storm. Defendant
subsequently refused to pay the claim, refused to explain the denial,
and insinuated that plaintiffs claim was fraudulent. Plaintiff filed a
tort action alleging that he had suffered severe emotional distress
and undue worry about his credit standing and reputation as a police
officer. The Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County sustained
the insurance company's demurrer to the complaint and, on appeal,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the lower court's holding

in a split decision.2" On March 28, 1979, a petition for allowance of
appeal to the state supreme court was granted.20
The superior court summarily held that Pennsylvania recognizes the tort of emotional distress only "in very narrow and clear
factual situations and never in a simple breach of contract situation. ' 20 2 The court further stated that to overrule the demurrer
196. E.g., O'Neill v. Keystone, II Pa. D. & C.3d 600, 603 (C.P. Phila. County 1979); Collins v. Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Phila. 613, 614 (Pa. C.P. 1979). See also The Legal Intelligencer, January 10, 1980, at 1, col. 3 (listing of recent Pennsylvania extracontractual damages
cases).

197. 262 Pa. Super. Ct. 331, 396 A.2d 780 (1978) (per curiam) petitionfor allowance of
appealgranted,No. 119 (Pa. March 28, 1979).
198. Collins v. Safeguard Mut, Ins. Co., 2 Phila. 613, 618 (Pa. C.P. 1979). The opinion in
support of aflirmance of D'Ambrosio is clearly inconsistent with the landlord-tenant case of
Beasley v. Freedman, 256 Pa. Super. Ct. 208, 389 A.2d 1087 (1979), in which the court held
that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress does lie for the breach of a duty
arising from commerical dealing rather than physical injury or impact. See also Fair v. Negley, 257 Pa. Super. Ct. 50, 390 A.2d 240 (1979).
199. Eg., Collins v. Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Phila. 613, 614 & 617-18 (Pa. C.P. 1979).
Recent cases have essentially relied upon the per curiam opinion of D Ambrosio to deny causes
of action in tort against insurers for mental distress and economic harm caused by wrongful
delays or refusals to make payments. See, e.g., Sardel Int'l Co. v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., No.
80-3773 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 1980); Fisher v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., No. 79-4153 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 7, 1980); Allen v. MIC Life Ins. Co., No. 80-0116 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 1980); Mazzula v.
Monarch Life Ins. Co., 487 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
200. D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 262 Pa. Super. Ct. 331, 333,
396 A.2d 780, 781 (1978).
201. Id. at 331, 396 A.2d at 780.
202. Id at 333, 396 A.2d at 781.

would be equivalent to placing insurance companies in the precarious position of risking a tort action every time they denied coverage,
no matter how frivolous the claim, and this would result in increased
premiums to the public. The per curiam opinion in support of affirmance summarized that $832.23 simply could not give rise to any
20 3
cause of action for mental distress.
Judge Spaeth's cogent dissenting opinion first refuted the per
curiam opinion's holding that a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not lie in the insurance context in
Pennsylvania. Questioning the court's statement that the tort of
emotional distress is never recognized "in a simple breach of contract," the dissent stated it would agree with the finding if the court
meant that something more than a mere breach of contract must be
alleged to support an emotional distress action.2° This interpretation is reasonable in light of Pennsylvania cases holding that exemplary damages are not recoverable in contract actions unless the
breach amounts to an independent tort. 2 5 The facts of D'Ambrosio
involved more than a mere breach of contract because the insurer's
conduct was tortious and resulted in emotional harm in excess of the
breach of contract damages.
The dissent further noted that the per curiam opinion is inconsistent with other decisions of the superior court. 2 ° In 1978, the
court held in two cases that a landlord who breaches the implied
warranty of habitability in a lease can be held liable in tort for intentionally inflicting emotional distress upon the tenant. 20 7 "For purposes of deciding whether a trespass action for emotional distress
may result from outrageous actions in conjunction with a breach of
contract, [there is] no difference between a contract of lease and a
contract of insurance."2 8 Both situations involve a breach of duty
arising from business dealings between a businessman and a consumer, and both situations involve adhesion contracts. 20 9 Furthermore, both the landlord and the insurer have superior power over
their clients and can easily abuse their positions of actual or apparent power, particularly at times when the insured may be in unfortu203.

Id

at 334, 396 A.2d at 781.

204. Id at 335-6 n.l, 396 A.2d at 782 n.l (dissenting opinion).
205. See W.W. Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 30 Som. 69, 75 Pa. D. &
C.2d 621 (C.P. 1975); Simon v. Technical Development Co., 63 Del. 94 (Pa. C.P. 1975).
206.: D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 262 Pa. Super. Ct. 331, 335-6,
396 A.2d 780, 782 n.j (1978) (dissenting opinion).
207. Fair v. Negley, 257 Pa. Super. Ct. 50, 390 A.2d 240 (1978); Beasley v. Freedman, 256
Pa. Super. Ct. 208, 389 A.2d 1087 (1978).
208. D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 262 Pa. Super. Ct. 331, 336,
396 A.2d 780, 782 (1978) (dissenting opinion).
209. Id at 342-3, 396 A.2d at 785-6.

nate circumstances and very susceptible to coercion.2 °
Though not addressed by the dissent, the court's final argument-that recognizing intentional infliction of emotional distress in
the insurance context will promote increased premiums and a multi-

tude of fictitious, trivial suits--does not justify denying recovery for
a genuine, serious mental injury. As one noted torts author has
stated,
It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even
at the expense of a "flood of litigation," and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny
relief on such ground. . . . [Tihe elimination of trivialities calls
for nothing more than the same common sense which has distinguished serious from trifling injuries in other fields.2 11
Moreover, there is no direct evidence that insurance rates will
necesarily increase. Extracontractual damages have long been
awarded in other jurisdictions without any apparent increase in premiums.2
MiM.212
A substantial part of Judge Spaeth's dissent dealt with the tort
of bad faith, which he felt that the court should have discussed and
adopted under the facts of D'Ambrosio.213 Judge Spaeth found the
evolution of the bad faith tort theory in California most persuasive,
and concluded that the same foundations exist in Pennsylvania for
the tort's recognition.
As early as 1930, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that
"[tihe utmost fair dealing should characterize the transactions between an insurance company and the insured. ' 214 More recently, the
superior court has defined an insurer's good faith duty as reasonably
performing the insurance contract to carry out the purpose for which
it was made, while simultaneously refraining from injuring the insured's rights to receive the fruits of the contract.21 5 Pennsylvania,
therefore, has long recognized a duty of insurers to act fairly and in
good faith with all policyholders." 6 Moreover, Pennsylvania policy210. See, e.g., id at 342-3, 396 A.2d at 785-86; Fair v. Negley, 257 Pa. Super. Ct. 50, 61,
390 A.2d 240, 246; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment e (1965).
211. W. PROSSER, supra note 82, at 51. The D 'Ambrosio court's comment that an $832.23
claim could not give rise to any cause of action for mental distress may be indicative of the
court's feelings that the D'Ambrosio facts represented a trivial claim. Regardless of the validity of such a conclusion, the court should have stated such rather than contrive reasons not to
recognize intentional infliction of emotional distress in the insurance context.
212. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
213. 262 Pa. Super. Ct. at 336-43, 396 A.2d at 784-87 (dissenting opinion). Cf. Sardel Int'l
Co. v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., No. 80-3773 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 1980); Yorktowne Mut. Ins. Co., 15
Pa. D & C 3d 99 (C.P. Lawrence County 1980), in which the courts denied a bad faith cause of
action based upon D'Ambrosio. Neither the per curiam opinion of D'Ambrosio, nor any other
appellate decision in Pennsylvania, however, has specifically addressed the bad faith tort.
214. Fedas v. Insurance Co. of the State of Pa., 300 Pa. 555, 559, 151 A. 285, 286 (1930).
215. See Diamon v. Penn Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 534, 372 A.2d 1218 (1977).
216. See notes 214, 215 and accompanying text supra" The insurance company in
D'Ambrosio admitted that insurers have a duty to act in good faith, but the company argued
that no action in trespass could lie for a breach of that duty. In support of its argument, the

holders have prevailed in suits against insurance companies for
breach of their good faith duty in third-party cases in which the insurer unreasonably refused a settlement offer.21 7 Because the same
duty of good faith is present in all contracts of insurance, permitting
insureds to sue insurance companies for the tort of bad faith is also
reasonable in first-party actions.
The D Ambrosio dissent further noted that the good faith duty is
imposed in Pennsylvania for the same reasons as in California.2 18
Insurance contracts are recognized in Pennsylvania as adhesion contracts, and insureds are likely to be in unfortunate circumstances
when they file a claim, thus being particularly susceptible to emotional distress.2t 9 The insured signs a policy not for the commercial
advantage per se, but for the peace of mind that he will be reasonably compensated in the event of loss. 220 Insurers constantly bombard the public with advertisements assuring us of the security that
we are purchasing from the insurance companies who are "on our
side" and backing us with "a piece of the rock." Policyholders
hardly expect in the event of loss to have legitimate claims unreasonably denied. 22 '
In light of the law of Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions, 222 it
is unfortunate that the Pennsylvania Superior Court would disallow
an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the insurance context, and would fail altogether to discuss the tort of bad
faith. The necessary bases for both torts exist in Pennsylvania. Furthermore, Pennsylvania policyholders have recently been demanding
their "piece-of the rock."2'23 There is "a need in the law and society
which is long overdue, '224 and Pennsylvania should at least attempt
to fill this void.
company cited Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8 (1966). Judge
Spaeth persuasively distinguished Gray, which held that an action for bad faith refusal could
be assigned because an action of assumpsit will lie against the insurer for a breach of the duty
of good faith. At no point did the Gray court stated that an action in trespass would not lie.

The issue addressed was not whether an action in trespass would lie, but whether an action for
bad faith refusal to settle could be assigned. 262 Pa. Super. Ct. at 343-4, 396 A.2d at 786-87.
217. See Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8 (1966); Gedeon v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 410 Pa. 55, 188 A.2d 320 (1963); Cowden v. Aetna Cas. &
Surety Co., 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223 (1957).
218. 262 Pa. Super, Ct. at 341-3, 396 A.2d at 785-86 (dissenting opinion).
219. Id See also Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977). In
Brakeman, the court held insurance contracts to be adhesion contracts in which the conditions
are dictated by the insurance company; the insured can only "bargain" over the monetary
amount of coverage.
220. See note 218 supra.
221. Id
222. See notes 109-135, 141-159, 194-221 and accompanying text supra.
223. See notes 238, 246, 266 & 268 infra
224. Collins v. Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Phila. 613, 619 (Pa. C.P. 1979).

B.

Statutory Recovery in Pennsylvania

Because of a lack of appellate direction, lower court decisions
have been inconsistent and have failed to determine whether exclusive remedies are provided by two of Pennsylvania's major consumer
protection insurance statutes225-the No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act2 26 and the Unfair Insurance Practices Act. 227 The statutes'
limitations on insureds' extracontractual remedies can be severe
when policyholders' injuries are greater than the damages recoverable under the acts and, thus, the statutes should be liberally interpreted to allow concurrent or alternative remedies to those
statutorily provided. Nevertheless, two recent superior court decisions have found the No-Fault Act to provide the exclusive remedy
for claimants under the Act.2 2 s
L Pennsylvania No-Fault Act.-The Pennsylvania No-Fault
Motor Vehicle Insurance Act 229 is designed to provide "a state-wide,
low-cost, comprehensive, and fair system of compensating and restoring motor vehicle accident victims. ' 230 The Act provides for
compulsory auto insurance, 31 payment of benefits regardless of fault
and as loss accrues,2 3 2 eighteen percent interest on overdue payments, 233 and partial abolition of tort liability on the part of participants in an accident.2 34 If an insured intentionally misrepresents a
material fact to secure benefits, the No-Fault Act permits insurance
companies to bring an action for resulting losses, including attorney
fees.2 35 An insured may bring an action under the language of the
statute for overdue payments, and he may recover the no-fault claim
benefits, eighteen percent interest on the claim, and reasonable attorney fees.236 The Pennsylvania no-fault statute, however, does not
provide recovery of damages for bad faith refusal to honor a claim.
Consequently, the issue arising most often under the No-Fault Act is
whether the statute bars the recovery of punitive damages in a tort
action for wrongful delays and nonpayments.2 3 7
Punitive damages for insurers wrongful delays or refusals to pay
225. See notes 238, 246 & 268.
226. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, f§ 1009.101 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
227. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
40, §§ 1171.1 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
228. Gurnick v. Government Employees Ins. Co., - Pa. Super. Ct. _ 420 A.2d 620
(1980); Smith v. Harleysville Ins. Co., - Pa. Super. Ct. - 418 A.2d 705 (1980).
229. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1009.101 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
230. Id § 1009.102(a)(9).
231. Id §§ 1009.104, 1009.601.
232. Id § 1009.106.
233. Id
234. Id § 1009.301.
235. Id § 1009.106(a)(4).
236. Id § 1009.106(c).
237. See, e.g., Gurnick v. Government Employees Ins. Co., - Pa. Super. Ct. _, 420 A.2d
620 (1980). See also note 238 & 246 nfy-a

no-fault benefits were denied in early cases under the rationales that
the statute provided sufficient punishment and that the penalty provisions should be strictly construed.23 8 Many of these cases relied on
the summary decision of O'Shanick v. Allstate Insurance Co., 23 9 in
which plaintiff sought punitive damages in a suit against his insurance company for failure to pay benefits within the thirty-day limitation provided in the Pennsylvania No-Fault Act. The United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania held that the
lack of statutory provision manifested legislative intent to bar recovery of punitive damages. 24 No authority was cited for its holding
other than restating certain sections of the No-Fault Act. The court
concluded that the Act is a comprehensive one which replaces the
basic accident and insurance law regarding liability for vehicle accidents. 24 ' The value of this opinion is questionable since it was decided in a vacuum. This federal court merely interpreted
Pennsylvania law concerning a particular issue for which no decisive
state law existed. The court judicially implied the concept of exclusivity in the absence of any legislative intent that would support such
242
an interpretation.
The most recent Pennsylvania appellate decision interpreting
the exclusiveness of the no-fault remedies is Gurnick v. Government
Employees Insurance Co., 243 in which plaintiff sought punitive damages from his insurance company for refusing to pay benefits under
the No-Fault Act. Noting that the Act explicitly provides for attorney fees and imposes an interest penalty on overdue benefits, the
superior court held that the provisions are the exclusive remedies of
a no-fault claimant, because "an interpretation which includes punitive damages for willful refusal to pay benefits would be an inappropriate exercise of legislative power. . . [w]hen the words of a statute
are clear and free of all ambiguity. ' '24 The court further stated that
it was not unreasonable to expect the legislature to provide for puni. 238. Eg., O'Shanick v. Allstate Ins. Co., 431 F. Supp. 382 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Whitaker
v.
Keystone Ins. Co., No. 2638, Nov. Term 1978 (Pa. C.P. Phila. County March 13, 1979);
Trimview v. Keystone Ins. Co., No. 4600, July Term 1978 (Pa. C.P. Phila. County Nov. 13,
1978); Jolley v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 3208, April Term 1978 (Pa. C.P. Phila. County July

10, 1978); Rabinowitz v. Pennsylvania Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2817, Feb. Term 1978 (Pa. C.P.
Phila. County July 10, 1978); Berkebile v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 6 Pa. D. & C.3d 243 (C.P. Som.
County 1977).
239. 431 F. Supp. 382 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
240. Id at 384.
241. Id at 383.
242. Jones v. State Farm Ins. Co., 127 Pitt. L. J. 96, 107 n.23 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. County
1979).
243. - Pa. Super. Ct. - 420 A.2d 620 (1980). The only other Pennsylvania appellate
decision addressing the exclusivity of the No-Fault Act is Smith v. Harleysville Ins. Co., - Pa.
Super. Ct. _ 418 A.2d 705 (1980), in which the same court denied an action in tort based
upon D'mbrosio and denied an action for punitive damages using reasoning similar to
Gurnick.
244. - Pa. Super. Ct. - 420 A.2d at 623.

tive damages if that is what the legislature intended.2 4 5 This decision
is likewise questionable because the court has in fact done what it
alleged it did not have the authority to do. The court has invaded
the province of the legislature by judicially implying the concept of
exclusivity in the No-Fault Act when there is no legislative intent
that supports such action. The statute is not clear and free from all
ambiguity with regard to exclusiveness of remedies because the statute fails to address the issue altogether.
Better reasoned cases have held that the No-Fault Act does not

bar punitive damages when nonpayment is accompanied by an independent, willful, tortious act. 2" While the Act provides an interest
charge for overdue benefits, it does not provide a remedy for wrongful delays or refusals to pay benefits. "The purpose of the payment

provisions of the Act is to induce prompt payment of no-fault claim
benefits and not to eliminate a claim for punitive damages." 247 A
statute does not alter or eliminate pre-existing common-law actions
unless specifically provided or necessarily implied and, thus, there is
a presumption that no change was intended when there is doubt or
ambiguity.2 48 The No-Fault Act only eliminates certain tort liabili-

ties for injuries arising out of the maintenance or use of a motorvehicle;2 49 it does not exclude tort remedies for bad faith refusals to

pay benefits.
The legislature could have provided explicit language to the effect that the no-fault remedy is the exclusive remedy, as it has done
in other Pennsylvania statutes.2 50 Since the legislature did not spe245. Id
246. O'Neill v. Keystone, 1I Pa. D. & C.3d 600, 603 (C.P. Phila. County 1979); Jones v.
State Farm Ins. Co., 127 Pitt. L.J. 96 (Pa. C.P. Allegh. County 1979); Whiting v. Nationwide
Ins. Co., No. 3816, Dec. Term 1978 (Pa. C.P. Phila. County March 5, 1979); Gasper v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 3512, Oct. Term 1978 (Pa. C.P. Phila. County Feb. 27, 1979); Armour v.
Concord Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1252, Aug. Term 1978 (Pa. C.P. Phila. County Jan. 8, 1979); Carter
v. Keystone Ins. Co., No. 5664, July Term 1978 (Pa. C.P. Phila. County Oct. 17, 1978); Mears
v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 5020, March Term 1978 (Pa. C.P. Phila. County Oct. 10, 1978);
D'Ottavi v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 2450, Feb. Term 1978 (Pa. C.P. Phila. County July 28, 1978);
Goodson v. Paulo, No. 2523, May Term 1978 (Pa. C.P. Phila. County July 28, 1978); McNally
v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 2873, Feb. Term 1978 (Pa. C.P. Phila. County May 30, 1978); Tuccio v.
Allstate Ins. Co., No. 630, March Term 1978 (Pa. C.P. Phila. County May 22, 1978); Roseboro
v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 3699, Jan. Term 1978 (Pa. C.P. Phila. County March 31, 1978).
247. Gasper v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 3512, Oct. Term 1978 (Pa. C.P. Phila. County
Feb. 27, 1979).
248. See Dozor Agency, Inc. v. Rosenberg, 403 Pa. 237, 169 A.2d 771 (1961); Buradus v.
General Cement Prod. Co., 356 Pa. 349, 52 A.2d 205 (1947).
249. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.301 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
250. For example, Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law § 1515K provides that dissenting shareholders "shall have the rights and remedies herein provided, shall be limited to the
rights and remedies prescribed under this section, and the rights and remedies prescribed by
this section shall be exclusive." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515K (Purdon 1967) (emphasis added). See In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 263 Pa. Super. Ct. 378, 398 A.2d 186 (1979),
aff'd, - Pa. -, 412 A.2d 1099 (1980) (judicial interpretation of the exclusiveness of Pennsylvania's appraisal remedy statute); Note, 84 DICK. L. REV. 543 (1980) (discussion of In re
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.). No such limiting language exists in the Pennsylvania No-Fault
Act or Unfair Insurance Practices Act.

cifically limit recoverable damages to the penalty provided in the
Act, other extracontractual damages should be recoverable. 2 5 '

The Pennsylvania statutory construction rules further support
the theory that the No-Fault Act does not provide the exclusive remedy for insureds who have wrongfully been denied insurance bene-

fits. Statutory remedies are typically preferred to common-law
remedies unless the common-law is necessary for carrying a statute
into effect.252 A major purpose of the No-Fault Act, however, is to
provide comprehensive compensation to accident victims. 25 3 If the
injuries to an insured from nonpayment of benefits are greater than
the penalty provided in the statute, the purpose of comprehensive

compensation will not be fulfilled.254
Perhaps the most important statutory construction provision is
Section 1929:
The provision in any statute for a penalty or forfeiture for its violation shall not be construed to deprive an injured person of the
right to recover from the offender
damages sustained by reason of
2 55
the violation of such statute.

Thus, the provisions for attorney fees and interest should not preclude the aggrieved insured from suing for additional damages resulting from an insurer's violation of the No-Fault Act, such as
unreasonable delay in payment.
Although Section 1928 of the Statutory Construction Act provides that 256 penal provisions should be strictly construed, 2 57 insurance statutes are not included among those statutes that the
Pennsylvania legislature has required to be strictly construed.2 58
Pennsylvania courts have in fact held that insurance statutes should
be liberally construed to effect their purpose.25 9
Consequently, the mere provision of a penalty for overdue benefits in the No-Fault Act is not a bar to recovering further punitive
damages, and it should not be if the insured is to be completely compensated for wrongful or tortious refusals to pay insurance benefits.
251. See Jones v. State Farm Ins. Co., 127 Pitt. L.J. 96, 100 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. County 1979).
252. 1 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 1504 (Purdon Supp. 1964-79).
253. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, 1009.102(a)(9) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
254. See Gasper v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 3512, Oct. Term 1978, slip op. at 3 (Pa. C.P.
Phila. County Feb. 27, 1979).
255. 1 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 1929 (Purdon Supp. 1964-79).
256. 1 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. §§ 1501 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1964-79).
257. 1 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 1928 (Purdon Supp. 1964-79).
258. Goodwin v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 491 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1974).
259. Eg., Sheppard v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co., 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 360, 346 A.2d 383
(1975). See also Heffner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 265 Pa. Super. Ct. 181, 401 A.2d 1160 (1979). Cf.
Smith v. Harleysville Ins. Co., - Pa. Super. Ct. _ 418 A.2d 705 (1980) (citing Couch on
Insurance and Corpus Jun's Secundum, court held that the No-Fault Act's provision for 18%
interest and attorney fees for overdue benefits is a penalty and should be strictly construed).

2. Pennsylvania Unfair Insurance Practices Act.-Pennsylvania's Unfair Insurance Practices Act of 197426 is a consumer

protection statute that prohibits unfair practices in the insurance industry. It is enforced by the Insurance Commissioner,2 6' whose chief
powers, inter alia, are the ability to conduct hearings, 2 62 to levy admistrative penalties, 263 and to seek injunctive relief for violation of
the Act. 2M No provisions exist, however, for a private party to main-

tain an action in the courts. A frequently litigated issue, therefore, is
whether a policyholder can sue
his insurer for a violation of the Un265
fair Insurance Practices Act.
A few lower court decisions have held that a private cause of
action will not lie based upon the unfair practices statute because the
Act provides administrative remedies solely through the Insurance
Commissioner. 266 One court, however, has awarded attorney fees to
an insured based upon violation of the Act, 267 and other cases have
stated in dicta that a private cause of action undoubtedly could be
brought under the Act. 26 8 One commentator has predicted that "this
Act will become the base for private lawsuits against insurance com' 26 9
panies.

One persuasive reason for allowing a private cause of action is
that insurance statutes are to be liberally construed to effect the purpose of the statute.270 Since the Unfair Practices Act is essentially a
consumer protection act, logic dictates permitting the consumer-insured to protect his own interests in court by means of his own lawsuit. There is no language in the statute indicative of legislative
intent to substitute administrative for judicial proceedings with re260. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1171.1 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). Cf.CAL. INS. CODE
790 et seq. (West 1972 & Supp. 1980) (California's Unfair Practices Act of the Insurance

Code is similar to Pennsylvania's statute, neither of which provide for a private cause of action
for violations of the acts).
261. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1171.7-1171.11 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
262. Id § 1171.8.
263. Id § 1171.9.
264. Id § 1171.10.
265. See notes 266-68 bfra. C. Shernoffv. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 406,118 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1975) (held that courts may enter money judgments for past injuries to private
litigants based upon California's Unfair Practices Act); Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973) (seminal case in California holding that
private litigants may sue insurers for violations of California's Unfair Practices Act, which
only provides for administrative remedies).
266. See Hamilton v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 425 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Larwood v. National Cas. Co., No. 76-926 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Collins v. Northwestern National
Ins. Group, 125 Pitt. L.J. 147 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. County 1977) (no private cause of action for
third parties).
267. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 557 F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1977).
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269.

Very, The Pennsylvania Unfair Insurance Practices Act-The Sleeping Giant, 56 PA.

B.A.Q. 438, 450 (1975).
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spect to individual claims. 271
The legislature likewise did not provide any language to the effect that the provided administrative remedy "is the exclusive remedy" under the Act.27 2 On the contrary, Section 1171.13 of the
Unfair Insurance Practices Act states,
The powers vested in the Commissioner by this Act are additional to any other powers to enforce any penalties, fines, or forfeitures authorized by law with respect to the methods, acts and
practices declared to be unfair and deceptive 273
At least one lower court has strongly suggested that Section 1171.13
provides the basis for a private cause of action under the statute.27 4

Moreover, a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, which was decided
under the analogous section of the predecessor Unfair Practices Act
of 1947, supports this contention. In Dozor Agency, Inc. v. Rosenberg,2 75 defendant left the employ of plaintiff and took with him
confidential client information that he used for his own benefit and
the benefit of another insurance agency. Plaintiff instituted an action
against defendant alleging violations of the Unfair Insurance Practices Act of 1947. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the
Unfair Insurance Practices Act of 1947 was never intended to and
did not vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Insurance Commissioner.
Thus, the court had jurisdiction to hear private causes of action
based upon the Act. 276 The Dozor decision was based on section ten
of the old act, which stated that the commissioner's powers were
in addition to any other procedures, penalties, fines or forfeitures authorized by law. .. .277 This wording differs from the present statute only in that the word "procedures" has been eliminated in
the Unfair Practices Act of 1974. Whether this was a conscious
omission by the Pennsylvania Legislature is unknown. Nevertheless,
the title of the new section-Provisionsof act additionalto existing
law-indicates that the omission was not conscious and that the
Commissioner's powers were meant to be additional to any existing
law. The Dozor holding is justifiably applicable to the present Unfair Insurance Practices Act of 1974, so that policyholders should be
able to instigate private causes of action based upon the statute.
271.
272.

Jones v. State Farm Ins. Co., 127 Pitt. L.J. 96, 101 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. County 1979).
Id See also note 250 supra
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1171.13 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81) (emphasis added).

273.
274. Collins v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Group, 125 Pitt. L.J. 147, 148-49 (Pa. C.P. Alleg.
County 1979).
275. 403 Pa. 237, 169 A.2d 771 (1961).
276. Id at 242, 169 A.2d at 774.
277. Section 10 of the 1947 Unfair Insurance Practices Act read,
The powers vested in the commissioner by this act, and the forfeiture provided for
violation of an order to cease and desist made pursuant thereto, shall be in addition
to any other procedures, penalties, fines or forfeitures authorized by law with respect
to the methods, acts, and practices hereby declared to be unfair or deceptive.
Act of June 5, 1947, P.L. 445, No. 202, § 10 (repealed July 22, 1974).

Further supporting a private cause of action, section 1929 of the
Pennsylvania statutory construction rules states that a penalty provision in a statute is not a bar to civil remedies to recover damages
sustained by reason of violation of the statute.2 78
Consequently, the Unfair Insurance Practices Act provides a
basis upon which to bring a private cause of action to recover extracontractual damages and policy benefits. If this statute were used
to redress insureds' injuries for wrongful nonpayment, this remedy
would have a distinct advantage over other remedies because the
wrongful conduct for which insurers could be held liable is delineated in great detail.2 79 Courts, policyholders, and insurance companies would know exactly what conduct is considered impermissible
in settling and paying insurance claims.
VI.

Conclusion

The imposition of extracontractual liability upon insurers who
wrongfully delay or refuse to make payments of insurance benefits is
one of the revolutionary changes presently occurring in insurance
law. Authorities recognize the need to balance the relative positions
of the insurer and the insured in order to protect the latter from unreasonable delay and oppression. Wrongful nonpayments can often
result in injuries that far exceed the breach of contract. The best and
most complete remedy for the insured is to allow the recovery of
extracontractual damages in tort actions of bad faith or intentional
infliction of emotional distress, which can be brought concurrent
with or in lieu of a contract action for the policy amount. These two
theories can be adopted in the insurance context in Pennsylvania because the proper foundations for both torts already exist.
Furthermore, Pennsylvania's Unfair Insurance Practices Act
provides an excellent basis upon which to recognize a private cause
of action against insurers for wrongful nonpayment. Extracontractual damages should also be allowed in no-fault actions because the
No-Fault Act was neither designed to nor redresses the evils of
wrongful nonpayment.
Insureds are entitled to have legitimate claims paid in good
faith and in a reasonable, equitable fashion. The current deluge of
cases against insurers indicates that many Pennsylvanians believe
they are not receiving such treatment. If not, then the courts and the
legislature must insure that Pennsylvania policyholders obtain that
which they have paid for - "a piece of the rock."
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1 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 1929 (Purdon Supp. 1964-79).
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